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Many Americans, including national policymakers and
military officers, undoubtedly "mirror image" Western
perspectives of the world onto their Soviet counterparts.
In the military command, control, communications and intel-
ligence (C3I) area this misguided approach can lead to
incorrect analysis and gross miscalculation of enemy capa-
bilities and intentions. This thesis is an attempt to sensi-
tize the American military officer to a sampling of those
cultural and ideological assymetries that can make Soviet
approaches to war and C3I decisionmaking radically different
from our own. Special emphasis is given to Soviet
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PREFACE
The methodology followed in preparing this paper was to
review a selected portion of Western writings on Soviet
views of war and use these work's bibliographies as a
pointer to applicable translated Soviet works. Research into
Soviet texts was confined to a portion of those contained in
the U. S. Air Force translated 18 volume Soviet Officer
Library Series. These translations though generally excel-
lent, inherently suffer from the same limitations and impre-
ciseness present in any translated work. Specifically this
is reflected in the tendency to translate Russian words into
their nearest and often broadest English meaning. This
unfortunately often results in "watered down" translations
where the total impact of a word's true Russian meaning is
lost on its English reader.
*
Adding to this lost meaning is the Soviet practice of
publishing "sanitized" English edition or export versions
that are purged of more sensitive issues that might unduly
excite Western readers. The Western reader can therefore be
ignorant of many warfighting principles and concepts
presented to the native Russian reader.
The third and most difficult area of translation is that
of imbedded contextual meaning. The Soviet Union is not only
secretive because it is a closed totalitarian society, but
also due to the nature of its cultural communication methods
that have evolved over the centuries (see Chapter I). This
peculiar cultural evolution has resulted in a society rich
in context and "hidden meanings. " In this setting the use of
"keywords" may evoke a series of mental "action chains" or
x For additional discussion on this problem of Russian
translation see Ronald J. Tekel, Russian Language
Translation in the U. S. Intelligence Community M. S. Thesis,
Naval Postgraduate School, March 1986.
thought processes that are understandable only to an indi-
vidual that has been raised for years under the Soviet
Marxist-Leninist culture. The reliance on Western Soviet
analysts of the Soviet Union has been primarily an attempt
to bridge this gap, recognizing that they too may be
victims.
This thesis was written for the National Security
Affairs emphasis area of the Naval Postgraduate School Joint
Command, Control, and Communications ( C3 ) curriculuiru This
emphasis area was created to better educate U. S. C3 students
into the nature of Soviet C3 and strategy. The paper is an
outgrowth of an inspirational series of lectures given at
the Naval Postgraduate School by Professors Robert B.
Bathhurst and James G. Taylor. Many of the ideas not attrib-
utable to other sources are the product of extensive note-
taking and inspiration from their courses.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Command and Control ( C2 ) has been defined as "The exer-
cise of authority and direction by a properly designated
commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of his
mission. " 2 Implicit in the exercise of this command and
control function is the commander's ability to sense the
nature of his own environment and assess the nature of his
enemy's capabilities and intentions. This latter intelli-
gence function cannot be confined to numerical tabulations
of enemy force capabilities, but must also focus on the
enemy's conceptual framework, i.e., the paradigm from which
the enemy views the world and will make his decisions. This
is a cornerstone to effective command in war--the ability to
understand the enemy and think as he does. As the military
historian and strategist Liddell Hart has said:
".
. . the primary requirement in generalship, and in
statesmanship lis) to guess what is going on behind the
opposing front, and in the opponents mind ... to look
at the situation—especially your situation--from his
point of view is the best way of trying to get into his
mind." [ Ref . 1: p. 6]
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a sampling of
Soviet political-ideological viewpoints that can have an
impact both on Soviet decisionmaking processes and on
Western attempts to deal with the Soviets. The motivation
for this paper was the author's realization that during his
13 years of naval service, many American naval officers new
next to nothing of the nature of their primary adversary--
the Soviet Union. What was worse, these officers often
assumed that American and Western views on war and peace
2 This definition was extracted from Department of
Defense, JCS PUB 1.
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were shared by their Soviet counterparts. In some cases
this led to complacency as officers assumed the Soviets
would react as we would under similar circumstances. This
thesis is an attempt to break this "mirror imaging" and
demonstrate through presentation of selected Soviet writ-
ings, that the Soviet view of the world and peace and war is
quite different from our own.
By understanding something of the Soviet's political-
ideological heritage and culture we can better assess and
predict Soviet intentions both on and off the battlefield.
This knowledge can prepare military commanders and policy-
makers as to the types of decisions the enemy is likely to
take when confronted with a given situation. The building of
large "Spetsnaz" sabotage and assassination commando units
can be properly interpreted as consistent with Soviet
ideology and "objective laws of war" that mandate taking the
fight to the enemy rear, i. e. , his unprotected and vulner-
able economic and political institutions and his decision-
making centers. Once the attractiveness of this rear target
is understood, the West can build suitable counters to make
Soviet attainment of these objectives costly and unattrac-
tive. Conversely this same knowledge can be used to attack
potential Soviet vulnerabilities and their own decision-
making processes. Strategic deception can be used to mask
U. S. intentions and misdirect Soviet resources. The building
of the MIG-25 interceptor in anticipation of the projected,
but deliberately fabricated, U. S. B-70 bomber deployment is
one example of successful exploitation of Soviet decision-
making at the strategic planning level. The important issue
is to understand the enemy and avoid the dangers inherent in
being surprised. At a minimum, knowledge of Soviet military
thought can teach commanders to "expect the unexpected" and
avoid the mirror imaging of Western concepts and values.
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The organization of this thesis begins with an explora-
tion into the problem of cultural stereotyping. In chapter
three we review the cultural and sociological roots of the
Soviet people. In chapter four we investigate
Marxist-Leninist theory and how this theory has been opera-
tionalized. Chapter five seeks to discover what Soviet
concepts of war are and chapter six surveys Soviet military
doctrine and the "objective laws of war. " We conclude in
chapter seven by summarizing the impact of these Soviet
viewpoints on selected aspects of U. S. national security.
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II. PERCEPTIONS OF CULTURE
A. MIRROR IMAGING
One cannot begin to discuss (much less write about) a
different culture without first recognizing that there are
problems of perception and perspective that come from being
imbedded in one's own culture. This most often manifests
itself in the tendency to "mirror image" events and traits
of another people in a manner understandable from one's own
cultural framework. The bias inherent in this misguided
approach can lead to complacent and self-serving interpreta-
tions of events that have quite different meanings in other
cultures.
On the military side this can result in intelligence
failures concerning enemy intentions that can lead to disas-
ters of the magnitude of an Operation Barbarossa or a Pearl
Harbor. Failure to properly assess and anticipate Soviet
actions can lead to surprise—and with this the accompanying
dangers of Western inaction or over-reaction. This was
demonstrated in the Soviet invasion of Afganistan and then
President Carter's (and by implication the U.S. intelligence
services') incredulity that the Soviets would undertake such
an overtly aggressive action (especially during Christmas! ).
The net result was U. S. and Western inaction to deter or
subsequently deal with the Soviet invasion. A similar series
of American (and Soviet) misperceptions led to the Cuban
missile crisis of 1963 and the resulting risk of nuclear
war. Had the U. S. better understood the Marxist-Leninist
penchant to seize and maintain even the slightest political
advantage, it may have earlier questioned Soviet ambassador
Dobyrenin's denials of Cuban missile emplacement. In this
case surprise led to a strong U. S. military response that
could have led to war if the Soviets had not backed down.
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On the military-technical side, the Soviet's construction of
an aircraft carrier has led many analysts to assume they
will employ this asset as the American Navy has employed its
carriers. This may not only be a wrong conclusion but it may
lead to incorrect planning and costly misdirection of
resources toward a suitable counter.
In the convoluted world of American politics, commercial
communications media, and government there is a seemingly
incessant drive to see things in terms Americans can deal
with. Americans appreciate, indeed insist that other
cultures have American like qualities they can understand
and empathize with. Some authors have written extensively on
this "convergence" mentality--"Americans sometimes seem to
hold the view that the corollary of friendliness is iden-
tity, or at least similarity." [ Ref . 2: p. 11] The danger of
this view is that it ignores genuine unavoidable differences
in cultural outlook which if properly understood could lead
to less miscalculation and better mutual' understanding.
Richard Pipes has attributed this convergence mentality
to the commercial-liberal orientation of Americans who
unconsciously assume all foreigners aspire to American-like
affluence and lifestyle. This results in:
a strong distaste for any sustained analysis of foreign
civilizations because such analysis might ( indeed, most
certainly would) demand recognition of permanent
cultural pluralities and this call for an effort at
learning and imagination is not required by its more
comforting alternative. [Ref. 3: p. 65]
As we shall discover, the Soviets reject any notion of
convergence insisting that Marxist-Leninist interpretation
of "objective laws" can lead to discovery of Truth. If Truth
be known, why compromise or dilute its significance?
15
B. CONTEXT AND MEANING IN CULTURE
Edward T. Hall in his book Beyond Culture 3 has
attempted to address this issue of "mirror imaging" from the
anthropologist's perspective. He has categorized cultures as
being of two main types--high context or low context. In
addition he has observed two different cultural perceptions
of time- -the monochronic and the polychronic. A short
discussion of each of these may help to break the reader of
any remaining "they're just like the folks back home"
syndrome.
1. Time in Cultural Perception
a. Monochronic Time
The Swiss, German, and American societies typify
the monochronic culture's penchant for time scheduling,
promptness, and doing "one thing at a time". Life is viewed
as a linear progression where detailed knowledge is valued
more than a holistic approach. The orderly life is valued
with time being saved, spent, accelerated, lost, or wasted.
A criticism of monochronic peoples (from the polychronic '
s
perspective) is that this highly structured view of time is
not natural to the human condition but is imposed, learned
behavior. It has the tendency to isolate the individual from
the wholeness of human nature and the world. More subtly,
monochronic cultures tend to think in segmented compartments
and deny the importance of context in relationships.
Monochronic peoples may therefore lose sight of the under-
lying meanings behind events. [ Ref . 4: pp. 10-24]
b. Polychronic Time
By contrast the cultures of Latin America, the
Mediterranean, and Japan have a polychronic view of time.
These cultures view life as a multi-level process in time
rather than a segmented linear path. Polychronic time is
3The following analysis of culture is based largely on
Beyond Culture , by Edward T. Hall, Anchor Books, 1981.
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less tangible than monochronic with the event or transaction
itself considered more important than its end product.
Nothing is firm in a polychronic world, there are always
changes at the last minute. One by-product of the poly-
chronic culture is the tendency to rely heavily on a
"headman" to coordinate their culture's otherwise disorgan-
ized efforts. This centralization of control increases as
demands and functions increase. [ Ref . 4: pp. 10-24]
Monochronic people who visit polychronic
cultures often depart very distraught and frustrated over
what they interpret as a general tardiness and disorganiza-
tion of effort. Polychronic visitors however are amazed to
see how regimented, controlled, and stressed monochronic
societies are. These different approaches to time are best
exemplified by the markedly different operating philosophies
of the German and Italian railroad systems. German trains
depart on schedule with or without passengers and are world
renown for their punctuality. On the other hand Italian
trains will strive to "deliver the goods" though often hours
or even days late. There are advantages, of course, to each
system and a personal preference for one is probably based
largely on cultural upbringing. The key is to be aware of
the different cultural perceptions of time and gauge one's
response and interpretation of events accordingly.
2. Context in Culture
Polychronic cultures also tend to be high context
(HC). The "group" is preeminent in high context cultures and
simple interpersonal messages are often high in contextual
hidden meanings. These meanings, hidden from the casual
observer, require considerable "programming" of individuals.
This typically occurs as the individual grows up in a
society. There develops a magnified sense of group identity
and ego. A distinction exists between "insiders" who under-
stand and "outsiders" who do not. Stability and continuity
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are prized and and authority—the "headman" is held accoun-
table for all lower level actions. In low context (LC)
cultures the individual is emphasized over the group.
Innovation is encouraged usually at the expense of having a
somewhat fragmented and alienated culture. Communications
between individuals is explicit with little hidden meaning.
There is constant movement and pressure for change vice
stability. Agreements and commitments between individuals
must often be enforced by law. [ Ref . 4: pp. 53-167]
High context cultures then tend to be polychronic
while low context are generally monochronic. Figure (1)
depicts the context and information exchange relationships
as a function of high context (HC) or low context (LC)
culture [Ref. 4: p. 102] .
HC
LC
Figure 2. 1 Context, Information, and Meaning
An American taking part in a formal Japanese tea
party becomes anxious and bored over what he perceives as an
overly long and drawn-out procedure for merely serving tea.
He wants to be served, drink, and get on with his schedule.
He is oblivious to the "hidden meanings" and messages being
communicated in this centuries old ritual. An American
having dealt with Japanese culture will immediately recog-
nize the cultural assymetry just presented. For us the
Japanese typify the "inscrutable" oriental and they can
often seem like two different people--one time cool and
18
officious, the next uncomfortably close and friendly. The
above assymetries can now be understood for what they truly
are--the meetings of two vastly different cultural systems
and values.
C. CONTEXT IN SOVIET CULTURE
The above cultural classification methodology may assist
in better understanding Soviet Russian culture. The Soviet
culture is a unique in that it combines both monochronic and
polychronic views of time with a high context view of the
world. We will see that Soviet Marxism-Leninism is a highly
structured and deterministic philosophy that contains nearly
every classic ingredient of a monochronic culture. This
philosophy is superimposed onto an historic Russian culture
that embodies much of the polychronic outlook. The soci-
ology of Russia prior to 1917 (see Chapter III) shows a
culture with a high degree of people involvement in the
village governing body or mir, the princely courts, etc.
Transactions such as the mir's annual land apportionment
were heavily dependent on personal interactions and the
involvement of a "headman" --the chief elder ( see page
32-33). This high context culture continues under communism
where the "proper connections" and unwritten behavior codes
dominate social behavior.
The introduction of a Western Anglo-German inspired
philosophy--Marxism--in the midst of a semi-oriental poly-
chronic high context state was bound to prove traumatic for
more than just the Tsarist ruling circles. Perhaps in recog-
nition of this Karl Marx felt his ideas better suited to a
low context Germany or England. The need for Lenin to tailor
Marxist teachings ( Leninism--see Chapter IV) to the situ-
ation found in Russia was probably a realization that modi-
fications had to be made. The severe bloodletting and
widespread use of state terrorism during the Russian Civil
War ( 1918-1920) and the forced collectivization years can be
19
interpreted as the resistance of a polychronic people to an
alien monochronic way of doing business. In any event Soviet
Russian society is unique in that it represents a high
context culture that utilizes an official communist mono-
chronic philosophy to govern an essentially polychronic
people.
The cultural schizophrenia brought on by the merging of
these widely different cultural perspectives may account for
the duality of character so often observed and written about
on the Russian people. 4 It may be one explanation for the
widespread incidence of alcohol as an escape mechanism from
the stresses and strains brought on by this mix of cultures.
1. Context in Soviet Military Thought
The application of the above cultural viewpoints to
Soviet Military thought is equally interesting. Whereas
Western approaches to warfare emphasize the initiative and
genius of the individual commander as being decisive, in
Warsaw Pact countries the emphasis is on control--the
commander's control of battle plan formulation in minute
detail and his control of the battle process. Soviet mili-
tary commanders are faced with indoctrinating an essentially
polychronic soldier into the unmistakably monochronic nature
of modern warfare. Perhaps the memories of how well the low
context, monochronic German war machine operated in World
War II serves as a frightening reminder of the potential
capabilities of their primarily low context NATO adversar-
ies' fighting potential. It certainly seems that the heavy
emphasis on planning and indoctrination and the Soviet
Communist Party's (CPSU) drive to create "the new Soviet
man" is in fact a quest to create a monochronic citizen that
will better achieve and adapt to the deterministic goals of
Marxism- Leninism.
4 For one author's viewpoint see Hedrick Smith, The
Russians , N. Y. Times Book Co. , 1976.
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The high context nature of Soviet society has
allowed Soviet views on war and the resulting military
strategy to develop in a manner that is quite alien to the
low context West. The Soviets do not confine their view of
warfare to its military-political context but (properly in
this author's view) see it as a struggle across the spectrum
of human social experience (see Chapter V). This portends
grave consequences for a Western culture ignorant and
complacent of this fact.
Perhaps the greatest potential impact of a Russian
"high context" outlook are the implications this holds for
Western intelligence. As previously noted, in a high context
society "hidden meanings" convey much of what would, in a
low context culture, have to be spoken or otherwise communi-
cated. As much of Western intelligence is based on analysis
of written Soviet products, this high context viewpoint
permits Soviet authors to preserve secrecy through use of an
elaborate "code" language:
Frequently books that contain the latest views on the
future are cast within a historical context that
obscures their importance to Westerners (but not to
Soviets). [ Ref . 5: p. 14]
Other Soviet analysts note the Soviet tendency to illustrate
concepts by way of reference to Western military ideas
though they undoubtedly ascribe to these concepts
themselves.
This use of hidden context allows Soviets to "get
the word out" and explain the latest official Party views on
the nature of war, military science, military doctrine, etc.




This paper will explore Soviet military thought and
hopefully avoid problems of "mirror-imaging". The assyme-
tries observed between Soviet and American thinking should
be understood keeping in mind the different cultural frame-
works the two societies operate from. To arbitrarily
ascribe fanciful similarities between Soviet and American
systems in the hope of promoting a common identity or basis
for mutual understanding is nothing more than intellectual
prostitution. The Soviet world outlook is quite different
from ours and is solidly based in Russian culture and Soviet
philosophy. We must recognize these differences and acknowl-
edge that some areas are potentially irreconcilable.
Understanding the Soviet cultural paradigm can prove the key
in understanding and predicting future Soviet strategies.
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III. SOVIET STRATEGIC HERITAGE
A. GEOGRAPHY
Soviet Russian geography is best understood by viewing
it in the context of the greater Eurasian landmass. To the
south of the Soviet Union lie a series of great mountain
ranges—the Carpathians, the Caucasus, and the Himilayas.
These mountains effectively isolate the Soviet Union from
the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and the Indian subconti-
nent. To the north are the Artie Ocean and tundra regions.
East are the historically hostile China and Japan and to the
west an equally unfriendly Europe. In the middle is the
Soviet Union, stretching almost halfway around the world
through 11 time zones and covering 17% of the earth' s inhab-
ited surface. The USSR is more than twice as large as the
United States and Alaska combined. One peculiarity of the
vast Soviet landmass is that despite having over 28,000
miles of coastline there exists only one year around ice
free ocean port—Murmansk on the Artie Ocean. Other coastal
ports are ice bound for significant periods and sea traffic
must also negotiate potentially hostile straits. [ Ref . 6:
p. 9]
The river systems of the USSR are no less unique. The
rivers of Siberia virtually all flow northward into the
Artie thus making them nearly useless as commercial trans-
portation routes. In western Russia, west of the Ural moun-
tains, the three major river systems— the Don, the Dnieper,
and the Volga all flow south and only the Dnieper and Volga
into seas— the Black Sea and the landlocked Caspian Sea
respectively. Historically these latter rivers have served
as the major Russian trade routes both in summer and when
frozen in winter. Their north-south orientation however has
tended to restrict trade with the West to the major Baltic
23
and Black Sea ports even after the advent of the railroad.
[Ref. 7: pp. 5-10]
The more strategic and important part of both modern and
historic Russia is centered in European Russia, specifically
the area west of the Urals. This area is part of the Greater
Russian Plain, a geographic mass which extends 3000 miles
from central Siberia to the Baltic and 2500 miles from the
Caucasus. to the Artie. In the area between the Volga and
Dnieper rivers are 250 million acres of tillable rich black
soil called "chernozem" [Ref. 6: p. 99] . It is this vast
expanse of fertile land that has served to draw the many
centuries of invaders that have made up Russia's history.
B. CLIMATE
The climate of the central Russian Plain is character-
ized by its extremes, of summer heat without rain and long
intense winters with snow. The interior continental position
coupled with the lack of any moderating ocean influences is
the primary cause for this condition. By contrast the
American Great Plains, though suffering similar temperature
extremes, enjoys the moderating influence of summer
moisture-laden Gulf of Mexico winds. The resultant impact on
agricultural production is dramatic. While nearly 60% of the
United States is tillable, only about 25% of the Soviet
Union supports agriculture. Poland and Germany on the
western reaches of this same plain reap some benefits of the
Atlantic, but the combination of distance and prevailing
northwesterly winds mean that the central Russian "bread-
basket" often experiences drought--typically once in 5
years. [Ref. 7: pp. 5-10]
C. IMPACT OF INVASION
The other adverse influence brought on by Russian geog-
raphy has been the long history of invasion. While the civi-
lizations of Greece and Rome developed under the relative
24
protection of geographic barriers of mountains and sea, the
unbroken Russian Plain has invited centuries of invasion
from the East and West. Figure 3. 1 is a partial listing of






























Figure 3. 1 Wars and Invasions of Russia
1000 - 700 B. C.
700 - 200 B. c.
200 B. C. - 200 A. D
600 B. C. - i500 A. D
200 - 370 A. D.
370 - 558 A. D.
558 - 650 A. D.
650 - 737 A. D.
500 B. C. - '737 A. D
737 - 839 A. D.
840 - 858 A. D.


















1. Origins of the Russian State
The original native people of the Great Russian
Plain between the Don and the Dnieper were primarily an
agricultural people. These people were conquered and inter-
mixed with by successive generations of Asian nomadic tribes
driven west by other nomadic tribes or lured to the central
Russian Plain by more abundant pastureland and food. These
tribes of Iranian, Turkic, and Mongolian blood were
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characterized by the use of cavalry and by the
military- feudal rule they imposed on the conquered. Until
A. D. 826 the primary cultural influences in Russia were a
blend of the oriental and western, with western contact
being limited to Greek and later Roman trading colonies on
the Black Sea littoral. Noteworthy here is the "scorched
earth" military tactic first utilized by the Scythians
against the invading Persian King Darius in 512 B. C. and
latter used extensively by other Russians in protection of
the motherland. [ Ref . 8: pp. 1-13]
Present day Russians trace their origins to the
Slavic tribes that arrived in central Russia (probably from
central Europe) beginning around the 5th century A. D.
These tribes broke into three main groupings--the southern
Slavs comprising modern day Bulgarians, the western Slavs
ancestors of today's Czechs, and the eastern Slavs later
called Russians. Like their nomadic predecessors, they too
freely intermarried with the local populace which by this
time had also been infused with German blood from the Gothic
invasions of 200-370 A. D. This Slavic population was essen-
tially agricultural with a strong family and communal orien-
tation:
In early documents these Old-Slavonic plowmen are
described as peaceful, moderate, mild and humane,
patient and sober, disinterested in power, hardworking,
living in social and political democracy. [ Ref. 9:
p. 32]
They were largely self-governing and owed allegiance to the
prince of the nearby city-state. [Ref. 8: pp. 6-9]
The first Russian state evolved from the collapse of
the oriental Khazar Empire and the subsequent invasion by
Scandinavian Norsemen or Vikings some of whom called them-
selves "Rus". The first Rus ruler was Rurik (862-879) who
divided his conquered territories into principalities
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governed by his three sons. The Rurik dynasty which governed
Russia from 862 until 1598 was characterized by feudal rule
and division of hereditary territories into numerous princi-
palities chief among which was the city-state of Kiev.
[Ref. 8: pp. 13-40]
2. Impact of Mongol Invasion
These divisions, lack of centralized authority, and
the resultant military weakness became apparent when the
Mongols or Tartars of central Asia easily invaded and
subsequently dominated Russia from 1240 until 1480. This
Mongol period stands as one of the most influential periods
in Russian history. In the words of one historian:
Not only were there territorial alterations, but the
?hysical and mental characteristics of the people were
ransformed to an almost unbelieveable extent, so that
the break between Russian culture and Western culture
became complete. [Ref. 10: p. 23]
Into the semi-stable conditions of the Slavic agricultural
population was introduced a 250 year period of domination by
a nomadic people with quite different sociological and phil-
osophic traits. The nomads of central Asia had personal
traits of ". . . self-orientation and self-aggrandizement at
the expense of others . . . . " and were governed by ".
the traditional philosophy of the steppe warriors which
tells them that might is right and only unchallenged power
imposed by fear and awe brings personal satisfaction and
security." [Ref. 9: pp. 27,42] It was these motivations
which fueled the incessant Mongol drive for new conquests.
The psychological impact of the Mongol invasion can
be seen in the radical changes occurring in Slavic folk
epics of this period. The formerly helpful and benevolent
spirits of the "Old-Slavonic" times became transformed into
gruesome demons ".
. . blood- sucking vampires, heart-
devouring witches . . . similar to those found in the
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underworld of the steppe nomads . . . . " [ Ref . 9: p. 52] The
old Slavonic social order was completely disrupted and a new
climate of doom and gloom permeated Russian society. A
number of Russian princes of this period were either
outright killed or fled west to Polish and Lithuanian
kingdoms. An even more significant number, however, became
adaptive to their new Tartar overlords. These Russian
princes found Tartar administrative and governing methods
well suited to their own personal desires for aggrandizement
and power. Tartar systems of taxation, transportation,
postal service, and military organization were introduced.
Tartar "trust" for these accommodating principalities
extended to the point where Tartar tax collectors were
replaced by Russians and Russian regiments were actively
utilized in the 13th century Mongol conquest of China
[ Ref. 8: p. 61] . The prince who could offer the most taxes
and tribute to the Khan was rewarded with a "yarlyk" or
charter of privileges that greatly expanded both his
personal wealth and territory. The end product of this
process was the rise of a few extremely powerful princes at
the expense of weaker princes and their own overtaxed
population. [ Ref. 8: pp. 55-70]
D. THE RISE OF MOSCOW
Prince Ivan Kalita of Moscow (Ivan 1,1325-1341) was very
adept at securing these yarlyk and greatly expanded his
princedom by systematically attacking those princes that
were resistant to either Tartar or Moscow hegemony. The
Moscow princes and aristocracy also adopted the Tartar prac-
tice of collecting taxes at the communal village vice indi-
vidual level. This practice proved very important in
Russian history as it is credited with giving further
impetus to the rise of the village governing group or the
"mir" (see pages 32-33). Alliances with Mongol chieftains
were often sealed through matrimony. It has been estimated
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that even by the end of the 17th century, 17% of Moscow's
aristocracy was of Tartar or oriental origin [ Ref . 8: p. 63]
.
1. Influence of the Russian Orthodox Church
The Orthodox church also aided greatly in the rise
of Moscow as the chief Russian principality. Under Vladimir
I of Kiev (978-1015) the Christian practices of the
Constantinople based Byzantium church had been introduced
into Russia- in 988 A. D. When the great schism between the
Byzantium and Rome based Latin church occurred in 1054 the
Eastern church viewed the Byzantine emperor as successor to
the Roman caesars and the only true guardian of the
Christian faith. In this scheme the church evolved into a
decidedly inferior position that recognized the temporal and
spiritual leadership of the Emperor. As the Constantinople
Patriarch wrote in 1393:
it is impossible for Christians to have a church and not
have a Tsar because the church and the state are in a
close alliance and interaction and it is impossible to
separate one from the other. [ Ref. 8: p. 140]
When Vladimir I sought to choose a state religion
the Byzantine church offered the greatest degree of secular
control. The Russian church and its metropolitan remained in
Kiev until the rapid ascendancy of Moscow showed that the
church could better spread the faith and gain in wealth by
aligning itself with Moscow. This relationship proved a
further impetus to Moscow's ambitions which were now justi-
fied by church-backed claims of the divine origin of
princely powers. The church also allowed the Moscow prince
use of the power of excommunication to control his adver-
saries [ Ref. 8: p. 164] . The dependency of the Moscow based
church on the Moscow Prince became nearly total with the
fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453. With the
blessing of the newly established patriarch of the Russian
Orthodox Church, the Prince of Moscow decreed Moscow as the
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new "Third Rome" and himself as the new Caesar or Tsar.
[Ref. 10: pp. 40-64]
2. Political Impact of the Byzantine Tradition
The Russian Orthodox Church was quite different from
the Rome based church as it developed a political and relig-
ious Orthodoxy that combined Russian, Mongol, and Byzantine
beliefs. These beliefs recognized the Tsar as deriving
authority directly and exclusively from God "... the Tsar
alone possessed rights, his subjects only duties." [Ref. 9:
p. 60] Church teachings depict an angry and revengeful God
that probably closely approximates the character of the
Mongol and Russian princes. To survive under these circum-
stances the church taught complete submissiveness--"Faith
and blind obedience were declared to be the sole road to
salvation ..." and ". . . manifestations of independent
thought was heresy and blasphemy." [Ref. 8: p. 166]
The Russian Church remained subordinate to the state
in both secular and ecclesiastical matters under the Tsars.
The near theocratic rule of the Moscow Tsars served to
greatly increase their power while the church gained in
protection and wealth. The Russian Church never developed
into a second seat of power that could balance or at least
moderate the growing despotic rule of Moscow. Instead,
following in the Byzantine tradition, the church became a
loyal supporter of Moscow absolutism. The social impact of
this was enormous. Under an increasingly oppressive rule
aestheticism and apocalyptic thinking came to dominate much
of Russian life. Monastic orders and hermitism flourished as
individuals sought escape. Those who did not withdraw devel-
oped a self-protective fatalistic resignation to the world
around them. This apolitical and apathetic behavior served
to heighten the already absolute power of the Tsar.
[Ref. 9: pp. 40-64]
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3. The Decline of Russian Aristocracy
In the face of growing Tsarist power political impo-
tence was not confined merely to the lower social classes.
Beginning with Ivan IV (Ivan the Terrible, 1533-1584) a
systematic effort was undertaken to weaken the power of the
aristocracy or boyars. Prior to this period Russian aristoc-
racy was based on patrimony or the transfering of hereditary
properties from generation to generation. Using a combina-
tion of cunning, deceit, and outright terror, Ivan IV gradu-
ally changed this hereditary right into a system of land
grants based on service to the crown. This had two far
reaching implications. First was the consolidation and
unification under Ivan IV and his successors of the many
principalities that made up most of Russia. Second was the
elimination of other weaker princes and the aristocracy as
competing sources of power. Now required to render service
and loyalty to the Tsar to gain or retain landholdings, the
boyar class measured individual power by their proximity to
and influence with the Tsar. Intense boyar rivalries and
palace intrigues resulted which the Tsars skillfully used to
further control and manipulate the Russian nobility. This
aristocracy never effectively developed as a potential check
against monarchical absolutism as occured in England with
Charles I and the Magna Carta. Instead, the Russian boyars
became distracted in internecine struggles and power plays.
The product again was increased territory, wealth, and power
for the Tsar. [ Ref . 8: pp. 182-208]
E. RUSSIAN SOCIETY
Russian society prior to 1917 consisted primarily of the
two classes already mentioned—the aristocracy and the
clergy--and also the peasantry and the bureaucracy. The
peasantry comprised an estimated 95% of the total popula-
tion. The middle class and the working classes were very
small. The bureaucracy while also very small played a role
in Russia disproportionate to its size.
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1. Russian Peasantry and the Village "Mir "
Living in villages remote from their overlords, the
peasantry evolved a system of governing unique to their
environment and conditions. Scratch and burn agricultural
methods and the severe climatic conditions already described
made bare survival a tenuous situation with food production
typically at the subsistance level. In this situation there
evolved a heavy dependence of people on each other with
survival being ensured only by group and not individual
effort. Under these conditions the village governing group
of elders called the "mir" grew in power and influence. The
mir was comprised of the eldest propertied male from each
village family and was headed by an elected chief elder. The
central principle of operation was to ensure that all
village lands were always under production. The village as a
whole owned the land, but each male had a right to his equal
share which was taxable. This system of land distribution
was the same for peasant owned land, for peasant tenants on
estates, and for serfs.
The total meaning conveyed by the word "mir" is
difficult to convey in English. It means both commune, land,
earth, and cosmos and its use by Russian peasantry conveyed
a sense of community tradition, duty, power, and sacredness
[ Ref . 11: pp. 348-349] . The mir elders were a very conserva-
tive group that generally opposed innovation as subsistance
living meant minimal risk taking. Peasants subordinate to
the mir were likewise resistant to changes in the
"successful" status quo. Assemblies of the elders were char-
acterized by a period of discussion, resolution, and voting,
usually by acclamation. The minority always submitted as
unanimity in mir decisions was an unwritten law. One
observer of the period wrote:
I know of many instances where peasants have set at
defiance the authority of the police, of the provincial
governor, and of the central government itself, but I
32
have never heard of any instance where the will of the
mir was openly opposed by one of its members. [ Ref . 11:
p. 419]
The independence from outside authority alluded to
in this passage was a function of the secrecy the mir could
command from its members. Villages were typically very
secretive lest their hidden resources of wealth become an
invitation to attack from outsiders. This perceived threat
came not only from nomadic warriors but also from nearby
villages and boyars. In this scheme the chief elder became
the sole spokesman for the mir and its only link to the
outside world.
2. Russian Bureaucracy
As previously mentioned Ivan IV was primarily
responsible for eroding the power of the Russian aristoc-
racy. By decree in 1556 military service became obligatory
for all who wished to gain or retain landholdings. The
length of service required was indefinite--from age 15 until
death or incapacitation. These service people or class
became known as the Dvoriane and evolved into the new
Russian nobility of the 17th and 18th centuries. Because
landholdings were no longer hereditary it behoved Dvoriane
children to also enter government service. This service was
open to all classes of people and the Dvoriane quickly
became populated by all types of persons from aristocrats to
former peasants. The amount of land awarded for military
service varied greatly with the high ranking officers
receiving both vast landgrants and nobility status. Even the
lowest ranking Dvoriane, however, could expect to obtain one
peasant household and an associated parcel of land that
could support him while in the service of the Tsar. The
middle and lower ranking Dvoriane were found throughout
Russia while the highest ranking generally concentrated in
Moscow near the source of power. Here they competed with and
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gradually displaced the "ancient" Boyar aristocracy as the
chief force in government affairs. The Dvoriane became an
important social force in Russian history and more impor-
tantly established government service as a prerequisite to
achieving wealth, power, and status.
Peter I (Peter the Great, 1682-1725) attempted much
administrative reform, most aimed at decentralizing the
central Moscow bureaucracy's increasingly lethargic stran-
glehold over Russian affairs. The Dvoriane had absorbed much
of the Tsar's discretionary landholdings so Tsar Peter
sought to remove this financial drain while simultaneously
providing for a bureaucracy more responsive to his control.
The result of these efforts was a new system of government
officials, the Chinovnichestvo, who were rewarded not with
land but with a salary. Because the old Boyar class and the
Dvoriane were illiterate 5 Peter I was forced to turn to two
main sources- the clergy and foreigners—to obtain these new
bureaucratic recruits.
Educated in Orthodox seminaries, the clergy and
their children were literate but more significantly thor-
oughly indoctrinated in the absolute Byzantine traditions of
the Russian church. This class became a natural ally and
supporter of Tsarist autocracy. Peter I also imported large
numbers of experienced foreign bureaucrats into Russia. 6
This influx of new blood initially broke the inertia of the
old bureaucracy and was responsible for many of Peter I '
s
reforms. As time and Peter I passed, however, this group and
its descendants soon realized that their position and influ-
ence also depended on the well-being of a centralized Moscow
bureaucracy. [ Ref . 9: pp. 53-86]
5 Even by the end of the 19th century in provincial
governments 80 out of 100 employees had no schooling whatso-
ever [ Ref. 9: . ] p. 72
6 In 1717 alone 148 Germans and an unspecified number of
Swedish prisoners of war were introduced into the middle and
upper echelons of the Moscow bureaucracy [Ref. 8:
. ]p. 375
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3. The Drive Towards Centralization
The new Chinovnichestvo gradually displaced the
Dvoriane and was firmly in control of the bureaucracy by the
start of the 19th century. Heavily dependent upon the Tsar,
this class became even more accommodating and subservient to
the wishes of the autocrat. A complimentary relationship
developed wherein this new bureaucratic class sought to
further centralize and consolidate power in the Moscow
ministeries and thus increase the control and power of its
Tsarist benefactor. This Moscow bureaucracy aimed to
perpetuate and preserve its centralized control and was
reluctant to share any power at the local level. The civic
history of 18th and 19th century Russia is in part a series
of contests between this central bureaucracy and the
Dvoriane dominated local governments or Zemstovos.
The philosophy that developed under this bureau-
cratic domination of an autocratic government was that
institutions existed to guide life and not visa versa. What
mattered was following orders from above. Obedience rather
than ability became the criteria for promotion. Reforms
undertaken were always initiated from above and input was
seldom solicited from either the people or from local
governments. Personal humility and self-abasement towards
superiors insured job security. Careerism flourished at the
expense of initiative and originality. [ Ref . 9: p. 72]
The outgrowth of a rigid bureaucratic caste was an
inherently inflexible government that looked inward and
insulated itself from political reality. This structure
proved incapable of dealing with the rapidly changing events
and revolutionary new political ideas of the 19th century.
This ineptitude was demonstrated in the continuing series of
peasant rebellions that plagued much of Russia during the
18th and 19th centuries. An interesting paradox is that
elements of this same bureaucratic caste gave rise to the
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intellectual dissident and revolutionary movements that
eventually toppled the Tsarist autocracy.
F. SUMMARY
The Russians have historically viewed the world and
their environment as hostile. Nature has been an adversary
and not a friend. Life is an incessant struggle and for the
majority of Russian history this has meant subsistance
living with few opportunities to innovate or experiment with
new ideas. The struggle for survival has made people depend
heavily on each other. This in turn has led to the estab-
lishment of governing methods weighted in favor of strong,
autocratic leadership. The village mir with its autocratic
and secretive ruling group of elders functioned as the
lowest governing element. An elected chief elder presided
over an oligarchical group of male peasant landowners who
ruled on the basis of collective consensus and unanimity in
decisions. This chief elder also served as the otherwise
secretive village's only link to the outside world. The key
to individual survival in this structure was "blending in"
and unanimity in decisionmaking. Those who failed to adhere
to collective decisions were exiled from the village to near
certain death in the violent and hostile outside world.
The Russian boyar or landed aristocracy was greatly
affected by two primary influences--the Russian Orthodox
Church and the Tartars. The Tartars helped the Moscow
princes to consolidate and expand their power following
traditional Mongol practices of political expediency, decep-
tion and ruthless use of brute force. The chief Moscow
prince or Tsar that emerged from the struggles of this
period governed in an intensely despotic and repressive
manner similar to his Tartar predecessors. Fear and intimi-
dation were openly acknowledged as the cornerstone to effec-
tive rule. The Church accelerated this drive towards
36
absolutism by acknowledging the Tsar's preeminence in both
secular and worldly affairs. It favorably compared his
revengeful and wrathlike behavior to that of God. The Church
also proclaimed itself the only true Christian faith with
the Tsar as its protector. The Orthodox Church effectively
isolated itself and "Holy Russia" from the "heretical" ways
of the western Rome based Latin Church. This left Russia
untouched by the Humanistic, Renaissance, Reformation, and
other revolutionary movements affecting the rest of Europe. 7
The result was a society fully indoctrinated and accepting
of Tsarist autocratic rule.
The Tsars established policies that eliminated any
competing sources of power and made the bureaucracy heavily
dependent and supportive of centralized autocratic rule.
Government service became a prerequisite to gaining wealth
or influence. An individual's power was determined not by
his government function or role but by his "connections" and
status with the powers to be. All power was derived from the
central government. Moscow became the "center" and Moscow
"connections" the key to influence.
G. CONCLUSIONS - THE RUSSIAN POLITICAL LEGACY
Political culture is a peoples perception of how they
should be governed and determines how they view the outside
world. The Russian people share a heritage that is remark-
able for its historically consistent authoritarian nature
andits contrast with Western political traditions. Today's
Soviet political culture shares many of the same traits as
those seen in Tsarist times. In some cases this identity has
been an attempt by Soviet leaders to build upon and gain
legitimacy from the older Russian legacy.
7 Learning Latin, the universal language of education and
knowledge, was considered sinful by the Orthodox church of
this period [ Ref . 9: p. 69]
.
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1. The New Marxist Orthodoxy
Perhaps the most interesting Soviet parallel with
the Tsarist past is the supplanting of the Russian Church
and Orthodox faith by "the Party" and Marxism-Leninism. Just
as the Tsarist autocracy relied heavily on its "divine
origin" as a basis for legitimacy, the Communist Party
Soviet Union (CPSU) has sought to evoke a religious spirit
of self-sacrifice and acceptance for the greater purposes of
the Revolution. Dinko Tomasic in his study of Russian
cultural impact on Soviet Communism 8 recognizes a pervading
and continuing theme of guilt that is evoked by both
Orthodox and CPSU teachings. For the Tsarist peasant obedi-
ence and subordination to the Tsarist "father" were the
cornerstone to personal salvation and a place in heaven.
For the modern Soviet self-sacrifice and compliance with the
dictates of the Party are likewise justified as necessary to
achieve the equally mythical goals of world socialism. The
similarity in religious tone and reverence is unmistakeable.
Like the Orthodox Church, the CPSU has developed a
sophisticated liturgy that sanctifies the domineering and
often ruthless conduct of Party leadership. The Party's
great leader or "vozhd" is virtually deified and his
pronouncements are considered infallible. This promotion of
religious-like qualities is clearly evident in the following
passage from Pravada:
Lenin's thoughts represent a superior achievement of the
Russian and the world culture; an eternally living and
eternally developing science of society--a fighting
banner of the working class--living soul of the
Bolshevik Party which led our fatherland to the avant-
garde of the whole human kind.
The books of the vozhd and teacher are immortal.
They live and will live eternally. Yes, Lenin lives, his
spirit is immortal--his idea is eternal--the leaves of
his wonder books are imperishable. [ Ref . 9: p. 207]
8 Dinko Tomasic 's study is entitled The Impact of Russian
Culture on Soviet Communism , The Free Press" 1953.
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This worship of the "Great Leader" is transfered
onto the living Party leadership who share similar god-like
qualities. Like the Tsars they are portrayed as benevolent
towards those who submit and wrathful and merciless towards
those who disobey.
The CPSU and its General Secretary thus become the
modern version of Church and Tsar and have achieved near
identical roles in the social and psychological development
of modern Russia. The xenophobia, narrow-mindedness, and
arrogance of the Russian Orthodox "Third Rome" is thus
perpetuated in the ideology of the modern Soviet state. The
result is the same--an uncontested political elite with one
view of Truth.
2. Politburo- -Successor to the Princely Court
Another intriguing parallel is the similarity
between the CPSU political bureau or politburo and the
traditions of the Boyar princely court. The politburo is a
secretive group of men hand picked by the General Secretary,
though in theory they are formally appointed by the CPSU
Central Committee. Just as the individual boyar' s power was
measured by his proximity and access to the Tsar so also do
present day politburo members stay in power primarily with
the blessing of the General Secretary. Though this power
seems to have declined with the advent of post-Stalinist
collective leadership, it appears that General Secretary
Gorbachev has reasserted this leadership role in his recent
politburo membership changes. The internal "bickering" and
"mafia-like" intrigues that characterized the Tsarist
princely court are evidently still present if we trust the
memoirs of Khrushchev. 9 It certainly helps to explain the
meteoric rise and fall of some politburo members.
9 For more on the inner workings of the politburo see
Khrushchev, N. , Khrushchev Remembers : The Last Testament ,
ed. and trans. Strobe Talbott" 19 74.
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While little detail is known of the operating proce-
dures or mechanism of this group, what is known is a system
remarkably like that of the village mir. Policy items are
introduced, a period of discussion follows, a consensus
develops, and a resolution is voted on. Though voting is not
always unanimous, minority acceptance of the majority posi-
tion is mandatory.
Another parallel is that the politburo will often
issue pronouncements in the name of an incapacitated General
Secretary, e. g. , Andropov and Chernenko. An identical policy
was followed by the ruling council of boyars for young or
incapacitated Tsars. The intent--to preserve the semblance
of regime stability and continuity--is the same. Though
there are many other similarities between the two systems
what is clearly unmistakable is the identical preoccupation
with political control and concentration of power as primary
governing themes.
A political culture has thus developed that is
nearly as alien to our own European derived traditions as
that of China or Japan. For this reason, the introduction
into Russia of alien European revolutionary concepts of
nationalism, liberalism, and democracy as a product of
Russia' s participation in the 19th century Napoleonic wars
was a rude shock to a culture based on 14th century oriental
concepts of rule. This and the isolation and intransigence
of the ruling elite spelled disaster for the old social
order. It was inevitable, however, that any new social and
political mileau would be strongly influenced by and gravi-
tate toward the autocratic nature that is Russia's heritage.
40
IV. IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS
They changed the meaning of words to justify their own acts.
Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War
A. SOVIET CONCEPTS OF HISTORY—HISTORICAL MATERIALISM
Marxist-Leninists view history as governed essentially
by the economic relationships in societies. Economic rela-
tionships form the substructure or foundation upon which all
human experience is based. Social institutions and values
such as truth, justice, ethics, and laws form the non-
economic, subservient superstructure of the human social
relationship. History when "properly" viewed in this
context is an endless series of class struggles between the
oppressor and oppressed elements of society. This contin-
uous conflict will end only when the highest "communist"
stage of social development is reached where all personal
property and wealth are abolished. This advancement to a
greater social order can only be reached by a violent and
"cleansing" break with the past social order, i. e.
,
revolution. [ Ref . 12: pp. 48-53]
This economic explanation of historical forces was
called "historical materialism" to distinguish it from the
more prevalent idealistic philosophies of the mid-19th
century. In contrast to the Hegelian belief of "all that is
rational is real", the materialists believe that ideas are a
mere reflection of the material world. In this sense
materialists would today be called realists. A materialist
view of human experience seeks to de-emphasize the impor-
tance of ideas, nationalism, and religion and accentuates
the importance of human labor ( surplus labor theory) and
class struggle as social forces. What emerges from this
analysis is a decidedly deterministic view of history that
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sees the world advancing predictably through different
economic stages to reach an ultimate advanced stage--utopian















Figure 4. 1 Marxist Class Struggle Historical Progression
B. MARXIST-LENIN I ST REASONING—DIALECTIC MATERIALISM
Marxist-Leninists seek to explain human, historical,
social, and even natural interactions by means of a
reasoning process called "dialectic" thinking. Karl Marx
(1818-1883) was first exposed to this thinking method by his
teacher the German philosopher Hegel (1770-1831). Combining
dialectic thinking with a materialistic view of the world,
Marx used dialectical materialism as the philosophical basis
for the doctrine of Communism in his Communist Manifesto
published in 1848.
Essentially dialectic thinking describes progress and
development as rising from the conflict of ideas or
processes that are contradictions of each other. In
describing class struggle, progress (termed synthesis), is a
product of a conflict between opposites--a thesis and an
anti-thesis. Figure 4.2 offers a conceptual aid in under-











Figure 4. 2 The Dialectic Process
Marxists do not restrict use of the dialectic to social
situations but find equal applicability in philosophy,
history, science, and nature. So it is that in politics
conflict between capitalists and workers leads to revolution
and in nature the dialectic between positive and negative
electron charges produces movement and power. To many
non-Marxist observers the dialectic and dialectic materi-
alism in particular are nothing more than an attempt to
legitimize and give quasi-scientific status to Marxist views
of the world:
Marxists are afraid that any philosophy of nature which
is not materialist will entail a corresponding
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explanation of history by other than purely material
forces. and that if nature is not taken to be
dialectical. neither can history be viewed as
dialecticaliy progressive. They therefore assert that
historical materialism is inseparable from philosophic
materialism, that dialectical materialism is identical
with science, that the whole Marxist philosophy is, in
Lenin's words, as solid as a block of steel, and that
"dialectics are the most generalized laws possible.
"
[Ref. 12: p. 58]
Soviet writings from medicine to philosophy faithfully
note their conclusions as careful products of dialectic
reasoning. There is evidence, however, that in many cases
this may be ideological window dressing where actual results
are obtained through commonly used western approaches to
logic. [Ref. 12: p. 58] . What is apparent is that much of
the dialectic process becomes quite dogmatic with
Marxist-Leninist acceptance an article of faith not dissim-
ilar from many religious tenets. This of course is a direct
refutation of dialectic materialism's avowed scientific
basis. In the words of one critic:
. . . the dialectic does not turn out to be a new logic
or higher thought-form, a fruitful working hypothesis,
the growth plan of the universe, the clue to history, an
adequate description of nature. or anything else:
instead it may be seen for what it is, a purely abstract
formula. a kind of sheer scholasticism, or as some
prefer to call it, sheer mysticism." [Ref. 12: p. 54]
What dialectical materialism does permit is a thinking
methodology that can validate and legitimize struggle,
conflict, and social upheaval as natural to the human condi-
tion. If the Utopian communist synthesis between capitalism
(thesis) and the "worker's revolution" (antithesis) is ever
to be reached, there must inevitably be a conflict between
the two. Class struggle will end only when the last class
enemy has been liquidated and by default there exists no
other class to struggle with. Measures to exacerbate this
conflict, i. e. , revolution, terrorism, "just" socialist war,
promote the advance of human progress and are desirable.
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C. MARXISM AND MORALITY
As noted previously, morality, ethics, and the law are
the superstructure which rests upon the current economic
stage or foundation of a society. The moral code in force at
any particular moment exists to serve and further the inter-
ests of the current ruling class. As best put by Trotsky:
All the social illusions which mankind has raved about
in religion, poetry, morals, or philosophy served only
the purpose of deceiving and blinding the oppressed
. . . . [ Ref . 13: p. 88]
Those who are in the oppressed classes are duped and accept
the ruling class concepts of rights and justice as their
own. Morality and goodness are thus directly attributable to
one's social class and period of history.
This logic has served as the basis for many of the
purges and executions occurring in Marxist-Leninist socie-
ties. The interests of the working class are the highest
form of morality while those of the oppressor are inherently
immoral--"Morality is what serves to destroy the old
exploiting society, to unite all the toilers around the
proletariat. "(Lenin, 1921) [Ref. 14: p. 103]
This view of morality justifies a wide latitude of
actions so long as the end result - revolution and Communism
are achieved. By definition whatever the proletarian leader-
ship, i. e. , the CPSU, does in furtherance of the class
struggle is therefore moral and just. As stated by Lenin:
"Dictatorship is rule based directly on force and unres-
tricted by any laws. The revolutionary Dictatorship of
the Proletariat is rule won and maintained by the use of
violence by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie,
rule that is unrestricted by any laws. "( Lenin, 1920)
[Ref. 15: p. 80]
This monopoly on morality coupled with the dialectic's
sole grasp of the truth has made Marxist-Leninists
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intolerable of Western practices of discussion and
compromise. Why bother to discuss what is already factual?
The analogy between religion again surfaces—seek the truth
and you will be saved—resist or deny the truth and you will
perish. Non-Marxist infidels are worthy of neither
compassion or mercy as they are merely obstacles to the
advancement of human development.
These philosophical concepts are not left to discussion
but are touted as "guides to action. " With near missionary
zeal Marxist-Leninist values are taught from earliest child-
hood in all Marxist societies. * ° Western thought if not
branded propaganda is considered bourgeoisie and faulty
because of its non-scientific, i.e., non-dialectic approach.
True scientific thinking always subsumes dialectic
reasoning.
The result of these unique political traits is a xeno-
phobic society with a near messianic view of its mission in
an "evil" world. The parallel with Tsarist Russia is clear.
The CPSU viewpoint is not unlike that of the old Russian
Orthodox Church where Moscow was the protector of the true
faith and the "center" of the known "civilized" world.
D. LENINISM
Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov (1870-1924), known to the world
as Lenin, is without a doubt the most influential man of the
20th century. It was he that molded western Marxism to
Russia and served as the driving force behind the Bolshevik
Communist Revolution of 1917. "Leninism" has become as
important a force in world affairs as Christianity and
Islam. It may well enjoy as many disciples worldwide.
10 For a Soviet example of indoctrinating children from
kindergarten through high school see Leon Goure, The
Military Indoctrination < '
Information Center, 1973.
of Soviet Youth , National Strategy
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The term Leninism refers to Lenin's adaptation of
Marxist philosophy to the largely preindustrial conditions
of early 20th century Russia. His ideas are contained in the
many articles, pamphlets, books, and letters he wrote during
his revolutionary years of 1893-1923. These are assembled in
the 45 volumes of Lenin- -Col leetedWorks . ll The Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) actively uses "Lenin's
thoughts" to support and justify virtually the entirety of
Soviet policy from agriculture and science to family and
foreign relations. The closest Western parallel is to organ-
ized religion's use of biblical scripture to promote and
legitimize religious and secular behavior. It is an inter-
esting and probably natural development that the intolerant
nature of the Tsarist Russian Orthodox Church has been supp-
lanted by the equally intolerant and xenophobic quasi-
religious practices of the Leninist CPSU.
1. The Theory of Imperialism
Lenin's contribution to Marxist theory was twofold.
First he founded the "theory of imperialism. " Second he
established the communist party as the sole interpreter and
agent of world change and progress.
The theory of imperialism expanded the application
of Marxism and the class struggle beyond an internal
struggle of the proletariat of the industrialized states to
include underdeveloped nations and colonial territories.
This widened the class struggle from a conflict of national
scope to one of international proportions. Lenin character-
ized the final and highest stage of capitalism as "imperi-
alism" where the capitalists of industrialized countries had
expanded their control and exploitation to underdeveloped
countries and colonies. These new found sources of wealth
xl This published collection is a source document for
much modern Soviet writing on everything from family life to
politics. See Lenin--Collected Works , Foreign Language
Publishing House, 1963.
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had temporarily "bought off" the capitalist countries'
proletariat who had also enjoyed some increased prosperity
at the expense of the underdeveloped countries' workers.
This respite would be short lived, however, and would inevi-
tably lead to a rebellion of this new world proletariat
against the capitalist rulers of the advanced states
[ Ref . 16: p. 195] . Leninism thus evolved Marxism into a
doctrine of international class struggle. This imperialism
theory helped explain the colonial wars of Lenin's time and
more importantly explained why the proletariat of the
advanced capitalist states had not yet revolted as predicted
by Marx. This talent of applying theory to practice was
described by his wife Krupskaya:
To be able to study new situations and problems in the
light of the experience of the revolutionary struggle of
the world proletariat, to apply Marxist method to the
analysis of new concrete situations—that is the special
substance of Leninism. [Ref. 7: p. 64]
This ability to adapt 19th century Marxist philosophy to
20th century conditions, has been credited by some with
saving an essentially moribund philosophy [Ref. 7: p. 55]
.
2. Dictatorship of the Proletariat
The other major contribution of Lenin was in his
conception of the role of the Bolsheviks--the Communist
Party--in "guiding" the state through creation of an elite
"dictatorship of the proletariat". This dictatorship, the
Party, would lead and direct the essentially backward prole-
tariat in their revolutionary struggle. Unburdened by bour-
geoisie law and morality, the Party would be the vanguard of
the revolution to be used as a "class weapon" against oppo-
nents. It was this intensely self-righteous and missionary
role imparted to the Party that set it apart from tradi-
tional western political practices:
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The essential and distinctive quality of Leninism was
the role that it assigned to the communist party. The
moral attitude which Lenin passed on to the class-
conscious Marxist—the attitude of a man with an insight
and a mission—was far more that of a militant religious
order than that which democratic parties associate with
a political party. [ Ref . 7: p. 53]
E. LENINISM OPERATIONAL I ZED
The philosophy and policies espoused by Lenin have
existed in the Soviet Union for nearly 70 years. The methods
and tactics used to perpetuate communist rule and provide
for world revolution have been molded into a strategy that
has been remarkable for its staunch adherence to
Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Patterns of Communist conduct or
operational behavior have been analyzed by a number of
scholars who have sought to understand Communist decision-
making. One such scholar, Nathan Leites, has studied this
operationalized CPSU behavior at the highest Soviet polit-
ical levels. 12 We will review a selected portion of his
findings to better understand the spirit of the Soviet
Communist ideology.
1. Perception of Enemies
Every institution or group not controlled by the
Party is an enemy or at least has the potential to become an
enemy and must be treated accordingly. The only reliable
friend or ally is that which is absolutely controlled, the
concept of neutrality is not accepted. Ideas of autonomy or
independence from party control are counterrevolutionary.
The Party must be monolithic, insist on unanimity, and guard
against attempts to infiltrate and unpurify it. These atti-
tudes are summerized in Lenin's famous dictum "you are
either with us or against us," there obviously being no
middle ground.
12 The following analysis is based on Nathan Leites
discussion of the subject in A Study of Bolshevism ,
McGraw-Hill, 1953. ~
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The leadership of the capitalist bourgeoisie ruling
circles, share the same cunning, ruthlessness, and sense of
purpose as the Party, albeit for opposing purposes. The
"cold-bloodedness" used by Russia's foreign enemies must be
reciprocated.
The Bolshevik characterizes both himself and the leader
of the bourgeoisie as the ones who really "know", who
perceive the hidden core behind the superficial or
deceptive facade. [ Ref . 14: p. 381]
and also
Our reactionaries are distinguished by an extraordinary
clarity of class consciousness. They know perfectly well
what they want, where they go, on what forces they
count. They are not half-hearted or undecided ....
(Lenin, 1907) [Ref. 14: p. 380]
The CPSU leadership thus "mirror images" much of
their own political ruthlessness and conspiratoral behavior
onto the leadership of the Western world. The congresses and
parliaments of the West are seen as clubs for the rich or
mere facades for the truely powerful who pull the strings
covertly from the economic power centers of Wall Street and
Fleet Street. The deceptive nature attributed to capitalists
is portrayed in Stalin's observation of President
Roosevelt's "New Deal" proposals:
The capitalists will say: presidents come and presidents
go, but we go on forever: If this or that president does
not protect our interests, we shall find another. What
can the president oppose to the will of the capitalist
class? (Stalin, 1934) [Ref. 14: p. 325]
The existence of a world-wide anti-communist
conspiracy is assumed as is a "master plan" designed to
encircle and destroy the communist state (this, of course,
has become a self-fulfilled prophecy, largely do to overt
Soviet aggressiveness). This underlying suspicion of
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capitalist actions extends to the point that even overt
displays of good feelings by the enemy can be categorized as
either a means of deception; as a reward for betrayal; or as
a grateful reaction to an incorrect Party position—one that
threatens the Party's extinction [ Ref . 14: p. 402]. On the
other hand, if Russia or the Party is verbally attacked or
castigated by the capitalists then it is obviously doing the
right thing;
This seemingly compulsive and exaggerated need for
enemies is probably a combination of traditional Russian
xenophobia and the tenets of Marxist-Leninist philosophy.
Dialectical materialism sees historical progress rising out
of the conflict and resulting synthesis of opposites. There
must therefore always be an enemy to allow for progress.
Acknowledgement of a neutral ground, an alternative course,
is to obfuscate the dialectic process.
2. Survival of the Fitest
The threat and fear of extinction is a theme which
permeates and drives much of the Leninist thought process.
The capitalists main goal is to preserve the status quo and
this can be achieved only by destroying the historical
instrument of change- -Communist Russia: "We know that their
struggle to take advantage of every opportunity to attack
Russia is incorrigible. "( Lenin, 1920) [Ref. 14: p. 406] and
again
As long as capitalism and socialism exist, we cannot
live in peace: in the end one or the other will
triumph--a funeral dirge will be sung either over the
Soviet Republic or over world capitalism. (Lenin, 1920)
[Ref. 14: p. 406]
The opposed and irreconcilable natures of these two
systems means that conflict is inevitable and unavoidable.
Though the doctrine of "peaceful coexistence" has modified
the means of achieving socialist victory somewhat ( see pages
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53-54), the concept of continuous struggle and conflict
remains a Communist catechism.
As struggle and conflict are inherent parts of the
revolutionary process, it is important to establish the
tactics necessary for socialist victory. In this regard,
Leninist tactics are noteworthy for their determined insis-
tence on victory at virtually any price. On the necessity of
revolutionary violence Lenin said: "Not a single problem of
the class struggle has ever been solved in history except by
violence. "( Lenin, 1918) [ Ref . 14: p. 358] Lenin also often
liked to compare the process of revolution to that of
childbirth-- "out of the painful, bloody, and tormented act
comes the beautiful child. " The primary concern throughout
is to preserve and perpetuate the Party which will serve as
the catalyst for human progress. Everything, including
morality, must be subordinate and expedient to this purpose.
Indeed, this is the basis of Communist morality: "At the
basis of Communist morality lies the struggle for the
consolidation and consummation of Communism"( Lenin, 1921)
[Ref. 14: p. 103]
3. Leninist Peace
Western concepts of peace center around its positive
connotations, that is not merely the absence of war or
conflict but the active pursuit of goodwill among men,
better relations and understandings between belligerents,
and a general Christian spirit of friendship and harmony.
[Ref. 17: pp. 160-162] A decidedly different view is given to
Soviet concepts of peace. As previously discussed, the
history of man is seen as a continuing series of class
struggles occurring according to the laws of dialectical
materialism. This conflict of opposites will not end until
the final synthesis--Communism is reached. This is the basis
for a Leninist peace--the defeat and liquidation of the
capitalist class enemy. One researcher has noted a striking
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similarity between the actions of Lenin and the views
espoused by the earlier Russian revolutionary (Narodnik)
Peter L. Lavrov (1823-1900). In particular the latter'
s
statements concerning both "peace" and the need to "spread
peace" to surrounding countries:
There can be no peace between the new and the old
orders. WEerever the social revolution may stop after
the successes of the first moments, it must immediately,
for its own defense , send messengers of the social revo-
lution beyond its borders. It must immediately take
offensive action by units sent further and further
beyond the border, so that the territory of workers
Ru s s i
a
on which the new structure of workers' socialism
will rise, will not be surrounded by an area in a state
of agitation and unrest. It must see that as far as
possible beyond the borders of the new society the still
undefeated enemy will be preoccupied with apprehension
and internal disorders. [Ref. 17: p. 29]
Soviet peace has many other hidden nuances that are
at odds with common Western notions of peace. "Peace-loving"
and "anti-imperialist" are synonymous and cannot be sepa-
rated in the Soviet mind (in this sense "peace-loving" oper-
ates as a high context codeword that incorporates many other
meanings to the Soviet reader). Under this mind-set it is
perfectly permissible to engage in peaceful pursuits by
undermining the capitalist social order, i. e. engage in
terrorism, subversion, and even war. As one author has
discovered even the definition of peace, in the Western
sense of the word, is curiously missing from Soviet diction-
aries and encyclopedias [Ref. 17: pp. 168-169] . What is
present are Leninist definitions of peaceful coexistence and
"just" socialist war.
a. Peaceful Coexistence
The concept of peaceful coexistence first devel-
oped by Lenin to rationalize Russia's non-participation in
WWI, was revitalized and reintroduced by Khrushchev at the
21st CPSU Congress in 1959. This was forced upon the
Leninists by the advent of nuclear weaponry and the late
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acknowledgement that growing numbers of these weapons made
thermonuclear warfare a non-viable strategy. These weapons,
even if introduced in a "just" socialist war, made possible
the annihilation of both capitalist and socialist adver-
saries. In response to these changed conditions the CPSU
proclaimed in 1959 that war was no longer absolutely inevi-
table. Instead the possibility of a "peaceful" victory by
Communism was introduced with the seizure of power coming
from a country's internal progressive forces. The Communist
seizures of power in eastern Europe were given as examples
of "peaceful surrender" by the bourgeoisie in the face of
suicidal war.
Peaceful coexistence is a special form of struggle
between socialism and capitalism In the international
arena. What we have to do, by clever policies on the
part of the communist and worker's parties and the
socialist camp under the leadership of the Soviet Union,
is to achieve the maximum results for socialism in this
struggle without causing the capitalist opponent to take
to arms. (Khrushchev, 1960) [ Ref . 18: p. 34
J
During the U. S. -Soviet detente of 1971-1976
Party secretary Brezhnev dropped all reference to peaceful
coexistence as a "tactical" measure insisting that it was an
important principle of a ". . . consistently peaceloving
Soviet foreign policy. " This "Program of Peace" put forth by
the Party Secretary was not without some important caveats,
however, as it further declared:
while consistently pursuing its policy of peace and
friendship among nations, the Soviet Union will continue
to conduct a resolute struggle against imperialism, and
firmly rebuff the evil designs and subversions of
aggressors. As in the past, we shall give undeviating
support to the people's struggle for democracy, national
liberation, and Socialism. [Ref. 19: pp. 194-196]
Peace then is not "total" peace but a Leninist high context
peace filled with caveats.
The Leninists thus demonstrate their flexibility
in strategy and tactics by downgrading the inevitability of
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a nuclear Armageddon involving the capitalist enemy. The
nuclear age now makes this only a "possiblity" that cannot
be ruled out if the "correlation of forces" shift markedly
to one side's favor. The traditional Leninist call for
class struggle has never been changed. Indeed what has
emerged is an increased emphasis in conducting economic,
political, and "national liberation" wars to wear down the
capitalist enemy.
b. Peace Treaties
One final note on the topic of peace concerns
Soviet perceptions of treaties and negotiations. The assym-
etries between Soviet and Western concepts of what consti-
tutes a peace treaty is again quite revealing. To the West a
peace treaty means a binding agreement, a contract to cease
hostilities. Leninists on the other hand view treaties as a
means of achieving markedly different purposes. First, a
treaty can be used to obtain a temporary respite from a war
that is going badly for your side: "A treaty is a means of
gathering strength. "( Lenin, 1918) [ Ref . 17: p. 170] Gathering
strength until sufficient power exists to strike out again.
Retreat in this sense is always preferable to annihilation.
Temporary setbacks will not alter the charted course of
history which is toward world communism. A second purpose
is to codify gains or loses produced by the fighting. This
was the tactic used by the Soviets in obtaining territory
from Poland and Finland after World War II. [Ref. 17:
pp. 168-171]
The sanctity of treaty provisions exist only as
long as one's forces need rest, then the struggle for a
higher communist order must continue. This is a policy that
is replete with 20th century examples, the most recent being
the ill-fated U. S. -North Vietnamese Treaty of Paris
"concluding" the Vietnam War.
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F. SUMMARY
Marxist-Leninism is a very intolerant faith. The modern
day Politburo act as "church elders" who seek to steer CPSU
policies towards a communist "nirvana" in accordance with
the word of Lenin. The theological basis for Politburo
actions is "dialectical materialism" whose "scientific"
constructs can explain and forecast the entirety of human
and natural experience.
Though historical materialism has preordained the direc-
tion of human progress, it is necessary for the more politi-
cally astute--the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, i. e. , the
CPSU--to seize every opportunity and shorten the path of
history. As the end result of CPSU actions will be good,
expediency and direct action are called for. Sentimental
questions of morality and truth are transient and
irrelevant—the firewood of history.
The enemy--capitalism--will ferociously fight to the
finish and will use every deception and tactic to postpone
or alter historical progress. Any group not with the Party
in this struggle is most likely against it. Peace and the
easing of tensions in the world is not possible with two
dialectically opposed political forces. Temporary codifica-
tion of a "momentary relationship of forces" is possible
with the enemy, but only if in the Party's interests.
While global nuclear war is currently not in the CPSU's
interests, circumstances call for Soviet military vigilance
to defend against or take advantage of a change in the
correlation of forces. In the interim struggle must continue
in the political, economic, and propaganda arenas to weaken
the enemy.
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V. SOVIET CONCEPTS OF WAR
"Our views on the essence of war and the views accepted in
the capitalist states doctrines are diametrically opposed.
Lieutenant General I. Zavyalov
Krasnaya Zvezda, 19 April 1973
We have previously noted the wide conceptual gulf that
exists between our own Western view of morality, violence,
and peace and that espoused by the practitioners of
Marxism-Leninism. We now focus on the main thrust of this
paper—the Soviet view of war. 13
A. THE MARXIST-LENINIST VIEW OF WAR
Both Marx and Engels observed warfare in the context of
the continental and colonial wars of the 19th century. For
them it was easy to describe a class basis in the wars
following the French Revolution of 1789. These wars were
essentially battles between the old European monarchical
order and the new nationalistic and eventually liberal,
democratic traits embodied by the French Revolution and
experimented with by Napoleon III. In these wars and insur-
rections Marx saw a justification for his theory of histor-
ical materialism and the advancement of humanity on the
basis of struggle and conflict between opposing social
classes. War, though undesirable, was seen as the natural
and inevitable by-product of dialectic conflict between an
old obsolete social order (monarchism) resistant to change
and the new nationalistic, liberal, and democratic politics
1 3The following is based on Peter H. Vigor's discussion
of the subject in The Soviet View on War , Peace, and
Neutrality
. Routledge & Kegan Paul : London, 1975~7~ pages
58-80 and Marxism- Leninism on War and Army , (Moscow:
Progress Publishers, 1972) trans. ' U. S. Air Force, U. S.
Government Press, 1974.
57
that were rapidly sweeping 19th century Europe (Marxists
thus can approve of the Napoleonic Wars as being histori-
cally progressive in accelerating the demise of the old
European aristocratic social order).
For Marx war was a socio-political phenomenon associated
with the creation of private property and the resulting
class structure of "haves" and "have-nots". Propertied
exploiter classes (the haves) conducted organized warfare to
achieve material gains and enhance their own economic and
political power.- [ Ref . 20: p. 6] As history and society
progressed and the economic means of production changed, so
did a society's (ruling class) views and methods for
conducting wars. Under pre-monopolistic capitalism of the
19th century, the principle reasons for waging war was the
accumulation of colonies as
sources of cheap raw materials and labor power, spheres
for the export of goods and capital, strongholds on
international trade routes. [Ref. 20: p. 32]
Figure 5. 1 shows a possible Marxist economic rationale for
conducting wars.
The existence of war also gave the ruling classes the
pretext they needed to establish large armed forces that
could be used to subjugate the "exploited classes" in their
own countries. The strike breaking use of troops in 19th
century Britain, Germany, and the United States while
purportedly concerned with maintaining law and order were
thus seen as instruments of class repression. Even today a
Western power's use of troops in student, race, or labor
riots is given as proof of the counter-revolutionary use of
troops to repress internal progressive forces.
In the Marxist view wars will continue to exist so long
as there continues a class system in the world. The only way
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definition this means a communist society. Herein lies the
paradox. For while Marxists yearn to see a world free of war
this can be accomplished only by eradicating the old
exploiting class. As the existing bourgeoisie capitalistic
ruling classes are unlikely to step down voluntarily, the
likelihood of violence is ever present. Marxists thus cannot
be pacifists for to do so is to deny the inevitability of
class struggle and victory for communism.
1. War as a Revolutionary Catalyst
Lenin was also heavily influenced by the continental
and colonial wars of the late 19th century and saw in them
both a class basis and the economic battling between ruling
powers for new resources and markets. This latter area
helped him to develop his theory of imperialism ( see pages
47-48).
For Lenin the first World War further demonstrated
the greediness inherent in competing capitalist states.
Probably just as important, however, World War I proved the
utility of war as a force in causing social change. Lenin's
October 1917 Bolshevik Revolution successfully used the
stresses and strains brought on by war to topple the 1000
year rule of the Tsars. Far from disowning war,
Marxist-Leninists thus see tremendous opportunity for revo-
lutionary change and progress. Lenin's many calls for the
proletariats of Britain, France, and Germany to stop World
War I was not an expression of pacifism but rather an
attempt to use the stress of war as a revolutionary cata-
lyst. This strategy ultimately yielded results in Russia.
War can thus serve as a tool of revolution by
exacerbating the internal conflicts and "contradictions"
always present in a class society. It remains for the commu-
nist agitator and revolutionary to take advantage of these
circumstances to advance revolution and the march toward
Utopian communism.
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"Good" can come from the most terrible of wars. The
communization of Russia, China, and eastern Europe are all
"good" examples. Lenin displayed a communist's amoral (and
self-justifying) objectivity on this point when he said:
"Some wars in history, for all their beastliness, have
helped in the development of mankind, have destroyed the
harmful or reactionary institutions such as absolutism
or feudalism." (Lenin, 1915) [ Ref . 17: p. 18]
It is therefore not for purposes of peace that
communists use anti-war slogans, take anti-war positions,
and are active in anti-war movements but rather to foment
stress, anxiety, and divisiveness within a society. The 1917
Leninist slogan "end the war" successfully promoted army
desertions and eventually the collapse of all Tsarist power.
More modern variations of this same theme should not be
overlooked as to a possible similar underlying motivation
and purpose.
a. Civil War
The fact that internal divisiveness may lead to
civil war is of little concern, indeed it is to be promoted
as a means of eradicating the last vestige of the "old"
society. That many innocents may be killed or purposely
liquidated is looked upon as a natural by-product of revolu-
tionary change similar to evolutionary species extinctions
that occur in nature. There is some evidence that Lenin
actually sought the Russian Civil War of 1918-1920 as a
means to employ extra-legal methods to totally liquidate
,i.e. shoot, the now "obsolete" Russian class enemies
brought on by communization [ Ref. 17: pp. 15-38] . The meth-
odical, brutal killing and starvation of over 10 million
Russians between 1918 and 1933, the estimated deaths of 30
million Chinese from 1945-1958, and the decimation of nearly
half of the Cambodian population are all testimony to the
ruthless thoroughness and efficiency of Marxist-Leninist
class warfare.
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2. War in the International Arena
The situation prior to 1917 was one where Marxists
hoped to foment internal state revolutions on a worldwide
scale utilizing war to destabilize the existing social
orders. Heretofore wars had been a bourgeoisie capitalist
manifestation with international competition and greediness
as the main cause. The establishment in 1917 of a communist
state in the world order called for new explanations on the
nature and meaning of warfare.
As the new international champion and promoter of a
communist classless society it was inevitable that Russia
should attract the enmity and hatred of world capitalist
circles. This was proven immediately after the revolution
with the Western power's intervention of 1917-1918. Only by
strengthening Soviet Russia could communism be assured of
survival and serve to inspire the world proletariat. This
Soviet mindset argued for an increased military orientation
of industry. Stalin's great emphasis toward heavy military
oriented industry ( an effort that continues today) was the
immediate outgrowth of these fears of capitalist encircle-
ment and annihilation.
Out of this fear war became expanded beyond conflict
between only capitalist states to include possible conflict
between one communist and many capitalist states. War so
conceived would therefore embody class struggle on an inter-
national scale. Soviet Russia, of course, would represent
the forces of the downtrodden international proletariat.
This bad guy--good guy view of the world has the Soviets
promoting themselves as proletarian crusaders against the
infidels of world capitalism. Any efforts to promote Soviet
power thus serves to further the "moral and just" goals of a
classless communist world order that will be free of class
struggle and war.
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3. Soviet View of Aggression and Self-Defense
Communist views of offense and defense are strictly
tied to their ideological concept of class struggle. They
differ markedly from Western notions. The right of self-
defense can be assumed only if a series of Marxist-Leninist
criteria are met.
First the aims or goals of the aggressor must be
determined. If these goals are progressive, i. e. , further
revolutionary struggle or the weakening of capitalism, then
the attacked party enjoys no right of self-defense (though
it may still exercise it) as this obstructs historical prog-
ress. The right of Russia to defend itself against Nazi
Germany is always maintained while the right of South Korea
to defend itself against the progressive forces embodied in
North Korea is vigorously denied. What is irrelevant is who
started the aggression, the importance being in the class
basis of the aggressor.
The other criteria is that all wars of territorial
aggrandizement and plunder are by definition "reactionary"
and hence qualify for legitimate self-defense. This criteria
proves to be quite flexible and self-serving, however, when
we note the Soviet annexations of the Baltic countries and
Finnish territory immediately prior to World War II. These
moves were justified as furthering the security of Russia
and hence the viability of the world revolutionary struggle.
Lenin was even more direct than Marx and dispensed
with classifying wars as either aggressive or defensive
deciding instead to give full weight to the aims of the
aggressor and benefits to the world revolutionary cause:
It is absurd once and for all to renounce participation
in war in principle, on the other hand, it is also
absurd to divide wars into aggressive and defensive.
(Lenin, 1915) [ Ref . 17: p. 70]
and again after World War I
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The character of the war does not depend on who the
attacker was, or in whose country the enemy is
stationed; it depends on what class is waging the war,
and on what politics the war is a continuation of.
(Lenin, 1918) IRef. 17: p. 70]
From this Leninist logic it evolves that socialist
countries inherently wage defensive wars as they are
defending the proletariat and their struggle for a classless
society. "Wars in defense of the socialist motherland . .
are unconditionally just." [ Ref . 20: p. 115] This is also
true in internal situations of civil war where the prole-
tariat seeks to defend its socialist gains. Aggression is
not committed by beginning a war, but by obstructing histor-
ical progress. The aggressor is South Korea who seeks to
thwart North Korea's progressive attempts to unify the
country under one socialist government.
The corollary to the above communist viewpoint is
that ethically or morally there is no disincentive not to
attack first if by doing so one behaves in "defense" of the
revolution. This may be the self-serving rationale that has
been employed in the Russian invasions of Finland in 1939,
Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in
1979.
This Orwellian "double-think" permeates much of the
Marxist-Leninist doctrine, but it is certainly at its best
when attempting to obfuscate and rationalize amoral Soviet
behavior. In this sense it is not surprising that the Soviet
Diplomatic Dictionary declares that aggression can only be
committed by "imperialist" states. By omission it must be
assumed that socialist states always behave in a non-
aggressive and defensive manner.
B. LENINIST CLASSIFICATION OF WARS
We have outlined the Leninist position that there can be
two general types of wars, "good" wars that favor the class
struggle and "bad" wars that hinder the progress of history.
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The Great Soviet Encyclopedia classifies the former as
"progressive and just" and the latter as "reactionary and
unjust. "
Because Marxist history is divided into different social
eras, the wars that accompanied these historical periods can
also be classified based on their "socio-political"
content. 14 Figure 5.2 lists the different types of wars that
can be described utilizing this Marxist-Leninist historical
framework. The Soviets put World War II in a "special
category" due to its "complex and contradictory" character.
This 'is no doubt Aesopian language explaining that there are
possible difficulties in justifying many Soviet war poli-
cies, particularly the pre-war treaty with Hitler. In addi-
tion to the wars displayed in Figure 5.2, a number of other
kinds of wars are defined in Soviet military-political
works. These are included in the following subparagraphs:
1. Wars of Territorial Aggrandizement , of Plunder , of
Dynastic~Ambition
These are unjust wars on the basis that they enrich
and benefit only the exploiting class at the expense of the
exploited. Though not listed under modern era wars it
appears that some conflicts, e.g. , the Iran-Iraq War may
fall into this category. Though "unjust" these wars can
prove to be progressive if they serve to advance the class
struggle by toppling an oppressive regime or provide further
impetus for revolution. The Soviet annexations of Lithuania,
Latvia, and Estonia were ( self-servingly) not wars of this
type but wars of "fraternal aid".
14 the following classifications have been extracted from
Peter H. Vigor The Soviet View of War, Peace , and
Neutrality , and from the Great Soviet Encyclopedia , 3rd
edition, Macmillian, Inc. : New York, 1974 and from
Marxism- Leninism on War and the Army , (Moscow: Progress
Publishers, 1972 ) trans. U. S. Air Force, U. S. Government
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Figure 5. 2 An Historical-Materialist Classification of Wars
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2. Wars between Capitalist States
These are the more "normal" types of wars. By defi-
nition socialist countries are excluded from this category.
The ""justness" of these wars must be determined on an indi-
vidual basis as whether the cause of revolution is aided or
not. World War I and World War II prior to Soviet entry fit
this category.
3. Imperialist Wars
Under Lenin' s teachings imperialism is the final
stage of capitalism hence no further "progress" is possible
under this system. This means that all of these wars are
inherently "unjust. " As this is the final stage of capi-
talism it is possible to foment internal revolution from
these types of wars. The duty of a communist then is not
only to oppose these wars as unjust but to heighten the
internal stresses and crises that may precipitate revolu-
tion. The Vietnam War is the most recent example of this
type war.
4. World Wars
These are battles between capitalism and socialism.
It is always assumed that the capitalists will start these
wars, and it is the Soviet's duty to "prevent the unleashing
of these wars by the capitalists. " To some analysts this
requirement hints strongly of preemption. Though formerly
thought of as the "final battle" it now appears that these
wars may be fought for limited, i.e., not fundamental objec-
tives. However if fundamental aims do become involved it is
likely this conflict will escalate into global nuclear war.
A new world war will be a decisive clash between two
opposed social systems .... A new world war will be a
coalition war .... A third world war will be first of
all a rocket nuclear war .... [ Ref . 21: pp. 237-239]
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5. Colonial Wars
These wars are inherently unjust and reactionary. A
recent example is the Falklands War where Argentina sought
to "liberate" the islands from British colonial rule.
Argentina's role was just according to Marxist-Leninist
criteria.
6. Wars of National Liberation and National Wars
These are rebellions or insurgencies of a country
against its foreign invaders or colonizers with the goal of
achieving national independence. These occupiers must be
either feudal or capitalistic in nature as the use of Soviet
armed forces "in fraternal aid to socialist elements" does
not qualify, e. g. , Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan.
Internal rebellions against communist authority are always
considered "counterrevolutionary. " Examples of these wars
include Algeria, Malaysia, and Vietnam.
7. Local Wars
These include both wars of the imperialist and
liberation type. The term "local" being used to signify its
relatively geographically isolated nature. The Soviets have
given recent new emphasis to these types of wars as they
feel increased Soviet power makes direct attack upon the
Soviet Union less likely than before. Frustrated by this
Soviet power, the imperialists will seek to thwart world
revolutionary movements on the local level. The creation of
the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) is probably interpreted
as the establishment of a dedicated local war interven-
tionist capability:
they (the imperialists} constantly resort to local wars,
hoping with their help to slow down the development of
the world revolutionary process. [ Ref . 20: p. 248]
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8. Limited Wars
The use of this concept is limited to its Western
meaning, to which the Soviets strongly disagree. The idea
that a war can be strictly limited in scope when fundamental
national issues are at stake is ludicrous to the Soviets.
The idea of a limited nuclear war is not understood when all
means must be utilized to ensure victory. The Soviets also
disagree strongly with the idea of "escalation control" as
they feel once started, nuclear weapon use will take on a
momentum all its own.
9. Coalition Wars
The employment of multi-national forces, such as
NATO and the Warsaw Pact, in a capitalist—socialist
conflict. If war should occur between these opposing class
systems it will be a coalition war and likely nuclear.
10. Civil Wars
These wars can be either (1) wars between opposing
members of the same exploiting class (e.g., U.S. Civil War)
or wars between the exploiter and the exploited. The aims
and effects of the latter types of wars are undeniably good.
Though the aims of the type (1) civil wars may be unjust,
the ultimate effect of the war (transition from feudalism to
capitalism) may be progressive.
11. Revolutionary Wars
"A war waged by a revolutionary party for revolu-
tionary purposes. " "War in defense of the proletariat. "
Essentially any war fought to further the goals of a class-
less society. By definition then any war authorized by the
CPSU constitutes a "just" revolutionary war.
12. Wars of Fraternal Aid
This is not a Soviet term but Peter Vigor's classi-
fication of the Leninist principle of fraternal aid in the
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context of war. The Soviet's would never admit to having
invaded or brought war to either Hungary, Czechoslovakia, or
Afghanistan. In keeping with their self-described defensive
image they prefered to provide "fraternal aid" to these
countries' progressive elements.
The most consistent trait found in the above Soviet
classifications of war is that Soviet participation is
always of a defensive nature and usually in reaction to
capitalist aggression. This "imposition" of wars by capi-
talists can be triggered under very liberally interpreted
circumstances as is shown in the following listing of "main
aims the socialist states pursue in wars imposed by the
capitalist aggressors": [ Ref . 20: p. 115]
• Defense of Socialism
• Defense of freedom and independence of all socialist
states
• Assistance to other socialist states in rebuffing
aggression
• Assistance to the working classes of capitalist coun-
tries, colonies, and young national states
Capitalists cause wars, socialists merely react to them.
This mind set is carefully integrated into Soviet writings
to the point that there is obviously a "party line" being
followed, often on a word for word basis. * 5 When it becomes
difficult to disguise overt Soviet military aggression, the
phrase "fraternal aid" is used to camouflage Soviet actions.
The presence in a country of even the smallest revolutionary
group or disturbance can be used to justify Soviet interven-
tion under this test.
1
5
The most frequent example observed by this author has
been the monotonous repetition of the phrase a new world
war, if the imperialists should unleash it, will be a coali-
tion war involving a clash of the socialist and imperialist
camps ....
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C. WAR AS A POLICY TOOL
Most students of the Soviet Union are well aware of
Lenin's dictum: "War is a continuation of politics by
violent means." This co-option of Clausewitz's original
statement reflects both Lenin's personal agreement with
Clausewitz's tenets on war and Lenin's acceptance and
approval of their incorporation into the Soviet state
ideology. Like most of Lenin's works the validity and
utility of this statement is promoted in the most modern of
Soviet military dissertations:
Politics is the reason and war is only the tool, not the
other way around. Consequently, it remains only to
subordinate the military point of view to the political.
[Ref. 21: p. 14]
Though it would be shocking to many sensitive Western
ears, the use of war as a means of obtaining political
objectives is openly advocated and accepted in
Marxist-Leninist circles. We have previously repeatedly
observed that exacerbation and continuation of the class
struggle is an inevitable part of the historical process.
War is merely the highest and most violent manifestation of
this conflict. To deny war is similar to denying the pain
that necessarily accompanies childbirth. The likelihood
that war will erupt between the two opposing social
classes--capitalism and socialism--cannot therefore be
discounted and in fact is very probable. This last principle
is deeply imbedded in Marxist-Leninist theory and will be
hard to gloss over--detente and peaceful coexistence not
withstanding. This is certainly one reason the Soviet polit-
ical leadership maintains and is able to justify a sizeable
military establishment at the expense of Soviet consumerism,
etc.
Does this mean that the Soviet Union will actively seek
war? In this thermonuclear age the answer can only be no--
unless they are assured of victory with minimal damage.
71
Leninists see war as one method, one tool in a large bag of
strategic tricks that can be used to manipulate and direct
the world toward ultimate socialist victory. If a political
objective can be achieved by non-violent, peaceful means,
i. e. , negotiation, diplomacy, public pressure, then these
less costly alternatives are to be used. Nevertheless war
and most certainly the threat of war can be used concur-
rently with non-violent means to pressure an opponent. The
key here is flexibility to the point of duplicity if neces-
sary; the most important thing being the ultimate success of
CPSU policy.
The policies followed by the Soviet Union in the Baltic
countries and in eastern Europe resulted in their communiza-
tion without resort to war. On the other hand, when diplo-
macy with Finland in 1939 failed to yield results, open
aggression was successfully used to obtain the required
territorial concessions. This carrot and stick, encourage-
ment and coercive approach to diplomacy is reflected in the
many seemingly incongruous approaches in Soviet foreign
policy. Probably the most recent example has been the simul-
taneous use of diplomacy and a "peace offensive" coupled
with thinly veiled threats in attempts to stop the U. S.
Pershing/GLCM theater nuclear weapon deployments to Europe.
The quick turnabouts in Soviet tactics, the combined use of
"reasonable" public positions with occasional resort to
threats are all in keeping with a long held Leninist
strategy of favoring the immediate impact of statements over
their substance or consistency. 16
This unconventional (to Western eyes) and unnerving
propaganda tactic has the additional benefit of forcing the
opponent into a reactive position where he reacts to Soviet
16 For more on Soviet negotiating tactics see Negotiating




initiatives either out of hope or fear. The target popula-
tion thus becomes manipulated and controlled by Soviet
posturing and not by the substantive issues themselves. A
good Leninist will seek to retain the initiative and be
flexible for any immediate gain or advantage. This is illus-
trated by Lenin's 1918 advocacy of the World War I Treaty of
Brest-Livotsk as only a temporary and expedient measure:
We must in no case, in not even a single strategic
maneuver, tie our own hands ... we must say that the
party commissions the central committee to denounce all
peace treaties and to declare war on every imperialist
state and the whole world as soon as the Central
Committee of the Party regards the moment as appropriate
The peace treaty is merely a piece of live
maneuvering. Either we stand on this viewpoint of maneu-
vering or we formally bind our hands in advance in such
a fashion that we shall not be able to move. [ Ref . 14:
p. 53]
D. SUMMARY
The Marxist-Leninist view of the world requires the
Soviet Union to see conflict and particularly war, in a
manner unfamiliar to most Westerners. This view holds that
conflict is natural to the present pre-communist human
condition. Ideas of compromise or permanent peace with the
very social system that causes war (capitalism) is tanta-
mount to surrendering hope for progress and advancement to a
better world condition under communism.
Soviet propaganda regularly notes the similarities and
"common" ideological basis between Nazi Germany and modern
American "imperialism". Who today would consider peace and
compromise with Hitler to be a moral deed? Utilizing this
type of rationale, the Soviet leadership can legitimize a
wide range of Soviet diplomatic and military actions that
would otherwise be seen as aggressive and destabilizing.
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VI. SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE AND SCIENCE
A. SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE
Military doctrine in the Soviet Union is a very
different concept from that used in the United States. In
the U. S. each service has a warfighting doctrine which
describes the employment of forces to achieve military
objectives. The Army and Air Force have a joint air-land
battle doctrine called Air-Land Battle 2000 while the Navy
has amphibious warfare and anti-submarine warfare doctrines.
The use of this word is fairly free and covers the spectrum
of conflict from strategic nuclear to guerrilla warfare. In
this regard, the Air-Land Battle 2000 European theater
warfighting doctrine better equates with the Soviet term
"operational art" or that warfare occurring at the theater
level. U. S. Navy amphibious and anti-submarine doctrines
better match the Soviet idea of "tactics.
"
In the Soviet Union the term military doctrine has a
very precise meaning that is carefully defined and
controlled by the CPSU. As defined in the Soviet Dictionary
of Basic Military Terms , military doctrine is
A nations officially accepted system of scientifically
founded views on the nature of modern wars and the use
of the armed forces in them, and also on the require-
ments arising from these views regarding the country and
its armed forces being made ready for war. Military
doctrine has two aspects: Political and military-
technical. [ Ref . 22: p. 174]
and in another authoritative document
Military doctrine is worked out and determined by the
political leadership of the state. [Ref. 23: p. 109J
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Military doctrine, then, is a political decision by the
politburo on the nature of modern war and the preparations
and methods for fighting it. It serves as the bridge between
political strategy and the military force requirements
necessary to implement this strategy. It is a long term
futuristic framework that in the U. S. would be called "grand
strategy" or national security policy. By nature it is a
relatively stable program that- once adopted by the Party
leadership is not open to further discussion or debate.
The political side of military doctrine is concerned
with the political objectives of a war, the allocation of
state resources for the military, and the goals and missions
assigned the armed forces. Military-technical questions
concern the methods and strategies used in warfighting and
the types of forces and weapons employed. [ Ref . 24: p. 74]
All other military-political decisions derive their
basic guidance and rationale from this highest policy formu-
lation which is based on Marxist-Leninist principles and the
objective laws of military science. Figure 6. 1 depicts
these relationships. Soviet military doctrine thus has a
heavy ideological flavor and can be assumed to faithfully
mimic the Leninist concepts of war and peace that have
previously been discussed.
1. Recurrent Themes in Soviet Military Doctrine
One researcher has attempted to identify the major
doctrinal themes from Soviet political and military writings
both public and restricted. 17 Though lengthy, they are
listed to illustrate the congruence and application of the




The following listing is borrowed in whole from
William T. Lee Themes and Topics from a Review of Military
Thought
. unpublished manuscript, October 1978 as quoted in
John J. Dziak Soviet Perceptions of Military Power , Crane,
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Figure 6. 1 Relationship of Laws to Military Science
• Nuclear war, though dangerous and unpredictable, is a
continuation of politics.
• Though war is not inevitable, a wide spectrum of
conflicts between East and West is possible, and the
USSR must be prepared for all of them.
• A nuclear war with the West would be "just" but the
USSR is not presented as the initiator.
nuclear war would be
damaged.
,
coalition war between the
Pact, worldwide in scope,
emerge victorious though
U. S. /NATO and the USSR/Warsaw
from which "socialism would
A doctrinal modification undertaken in the mid-1960'
s
allows for the possibility of a conventional phase in a
superpower conflict in Europe and for conventional wars
occurring elsewhere. However, escalation to tactical,
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theater, and intercontinental nuclear exchanges from a
conventional phase is highly likely.
Military doctrine is by definition offensive, since
such an approach is the most effective means to bring
about the rapid defeat of the enemy.
• Should a war occur, overriding Soviet military objec-
tives will be to: (1) deliver preemptive counterforce
strikes to limit damage to the USSR; (2) insure
surviving "reserves" for a second strike; (3) inflict
total defeat on the enemy; and (4) occupy critical
enemy territory. In the Soviet idiom, to frustrate
and repulse" an enemy attack connotes preemption and
counterforce strikes and active and passive defense
measures, all designed to destroy as much as possible
of the enemy forces and limit damage to the USSR.
• The basic political goal in any war is victory. In
nuclear war, victory means: ( 1) though damaged, the
USSR continues to function politically, economically,
and militarily after the initial exchange; (2) prosecu-
tion of the war continues until all enemy forces are
destroyed or defeated; (3) Europe is occupied: (4) the
USSR recovers in a reasonable time and Soviet-directed
socialism prevails in the world.
• The USSR has no intention of conducting war termination
negotiations with the government in power at the begin-
ning of the war.
• Nuclear war may be short, concluding after a massive
exchange. However, a protracted war is also possible,
increasing the need for conventional forces to "secure
the victory.
• Nuclear weapons may be used selectively in a "battle-
management" sense. especially to preserve European
economic/industrial assets for subsequent Soviet
exploitation. Nuclear weapons may be used to change the
"correlation of forces" in one's favor in either
preemption or retaliation; however, they are not used
for limited" or demonstration purposes in the
Western sense.
• The objective of the CPSU's military equipment policy
since the first Five Year Plan ( 1928) has been quanti-
tative and qualitative technological superiority.
Figure 6. 2 displays a sampling of these U. S. -Soviet assyme-
tries concerning war.
2. On Nuclear Weapons
As can be seen, nuclear weapons hold a special place
in Soviet military doctrine and Soviet strategists give
these weapons considerable weight in determining war












































Figure 6. 2 U. S. vs. Soviet Assymetries of War
to believe that the Soviets operate from a nuclear war-
winning strategy [ Ref . 25: pp. 7-54] . This opinion is
derived in part from the many Soviet scholarly military
works (especially the Soviet Officer's Library series) that
contain passages similar to the following:
Today' s weapons make it possible to achieve strategic
objectives very quickly. The very fast nuclear attack on
the enemy may inflict such immense casualties and
produce such vast destruction that his economic, moral-
political and military capabilities will collapse,
making it impossible for him to continue the struggle,
and presenting him with the fact of defeat. [ Ref. 20:
p. 121
The fact that this idea is horrendous to Western
ears serves to illustrate the great assymetries that exist
between a liberal, democratic culture and that of a militar-
istic, totalitarian state. To the Soviets it would be ludi-
crous to deny themselves the use of the most powerful
weapons if history demands the liquidation of the interna-
tional class enemy. Military doctrine is thus offensive in
character and unlimited in the means necessary to achieve
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socialist victory (this possibly accounts for the reported
use of outlawed chemical weapons by communists in both
Cambodia and Afghanistan). The following passage from The
Officer' s Handbook disposes of the Western liberal concept
of no victors in a nuclear war:
There is profound error and harm in the disorienting
claims of bourgeois ideologes that there will be no
victor in a thermonuclear world war. The peoples of the
world will put an end to imperialism, which is the cause
of incalculable suffering. [ Ref . 26: p. 17]
Though the initial priorities assigned nuclear weapons are
military targets, a broader target base is envisioned so as
to insure the obliteration of the class enemy:
The objective of such a {world} war is not only the
defeat of the enemy's armed forces but also disruption
and destruction of the enemy s administrative-political
and military-industrial centers, total disorganization
of the enemy's rear areas. As a result of a colossal
increase in the destructive capablities of weapons, and
particularly nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, during
the course of war decisive strategic results are
attained, which can very quickly and directly determine
the outcome of the war and consequently the attainment
of its main political goal. [Ref. 27: p. 46J
The importance of attacking the enemy "rear" and those areas
enumerated in "the objective laws of war" (see pages 83-88)
is highlighted in the following passage which discusses the
strategic goal of the actions of armed forces which
may be formulated as a task involving some degree of
weakening or undermining the economic, moral-political
and purely military potentials of an enemy coalition or
country, as a result of which the enemy will be unable
to continue the war in an organized manner. [ Ref. 25:
p. 16]
Soviet military doctrine assumes, according to
Marxist-Leninist theory, that the next major war will be a
war to the end. Though the initial phases may be
conventional, escalation control is impossible and the war
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will quickly become nuclear. It is thus to the Soviet's
advantage to build better and increasing numbers of weapons
while seeking through various means to retard weapon
development and acquisition by his enemy.
The Soviet drive for disarmament and banning of
nuclear weapons can be seen as an attempt to disarm the
opponent while retaining or gaining the decisive edge. The
Soviet's can justify this seemingly inequitable bargain
through use of the Marxist just/unjust war theory. If
nuclear weapons are banned from only unjust wars this by
definition leaves only the Soviet's with a nuclear monopoly!
As stated by the Russian editor to Sokolovsky's Military
Strategy :
As for the Soviet Union it has always resolutely opposed
international agreements legalizing unjust wars. Our
country is consistently struggling tor general and
complete disarmament. That is
,
for the destruction of
all materials for waging such wars . ( author's emphasisT
fftef. 28: p. 14]
—
This explains why it is inherently immoral for the U. S. to
have nuclear weapons, but not for the Soviet Union.
B. SOVIET MILITARY SCIENCE
Military science investigates the laws of strictly armed
warfare, develops questions on the theory of military
art, which comprises the basic content of military
science, and questions of development and training of
the armed forces and their military-technical
outfitting, and also analyzes the military historical
experience accumulated. [ Ref . 29: p. 56]
In the Soviet Union military science is considered as
much a social science as history or sociology. Military
officers regularly study and are awarded advanced degrees in
this field. Many of these military scholars are employed in
the Soviet counterparts to U. S. think tanks such as RAND and
the Hudson institute. They also serve on various Soviet
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international disarmament and negotiation committees.
[Ref. 24: pp. 69-80]
The high prestige and academic status accorded these
officers is a reflection of the importance given their role
in the development of Soviet military-political theory and
policy. The extensive research and publication of scholarly
military affairs articles indicates the Soviets give heavy
weight to the possible payoffs to be gained in studying and
formulating military science. Figure 6. 3 shows the relation-
ship of Soviet Military Science to Marxist-Leninist thought
and the armed forces [Ref. 24: p. 71] . The most important
part of military science is military art and its three main
elements—strategy, operational art, and tactics.
1. Strategy
Strategy is the tool of military doctrine and is
concerned with implementing the decisions embodied in that
doctrine. Strategy also gives impetus to doctrine and is
concerned primarily with conflict at the inter-theater and
global levels [ Ref. 24: p. 74] . There are two sides to
strategy: the theoretical and the applied.
The theoretical side covers principles of strategy
and addresses the theoretical basis for war plan develop-
ment. In the U. S. this would probably include such theories
as flexible response, counterforce, countervalue, etc. These
principles are formulated in accordance with the objective
laws of war (see pages 83-88). The applied side formulates
and probably exercises actual war plan development, also
according to the laws of war.
2. Operational Art
Operational Art is concerned with developing combat
principles for waging battle at the theater level. As such
it is heavily influenced by the need to develop principles
for combined arms operations. Each of the five Soviet
services—the Strategic Nuclear Forces, the Ground Forces,
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the Troops of the National Air Defense, the Air Forces, and
the Navy all have their own operational art [ Ref . 24: p. 70]
.
This is essentially a service's way of conducting the busi-
ness of war similar to how the U. S. Air Force and Army
interact in Europe under Air-Land Battle 2000. The major
difference is that Soviet operational art will always seek




Tactics applies to division level operations or
smaller. These can be further broken down into infantry
tactics, armor tactics, air defense tactics, etc. The
meaning of tactics to American and Soviet officers is nearly
identical.
An important feature of Soviet Military Science that
must be appreciated by the West is that the Soviets see the
study of war as a control problem more than a leadership
problem. While Western readers read of the combat genius of
an Eisenhower, MacArthur, or Nimitz, Soviet researchers are
more interested in discovering the common laws or themes of
control that led to these commander's success. Warfare and
the science of war thus becomes essentially the problem and
science of control. This is a partial explanation for the
great Soviet interest in cybernetics ( the science of control
and control systems), especially in military circles. 18
C. THE LAWS OF WAR
The application of scientific socialism to the social
phenomena of war enables Marxist-Leninists to better explain
the underlying basis or truths that are necessary to achieve
victory in the class struggle. The formulation and study of
these laws of war are a very important part of Soviet mili-
tary science. These laws of war are defined as:
The substantial, recurrent, and inseparable associations
which are organically inherent in war, and which deter-
mine its conduct, course, and outcome. [ Ref . 22: p. 138]
18 For more on this cybernetic connection with Soviet
society see James G. Taylor "Initial Concepts of Soviet
Control
, unpublished manuscript, Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, Ca. , 1985.
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The Soviets insist that these laws are objective and
therefore apply equally to capitalist and socialist forces.
The fact that the West is somewhat oblivious to these prin-
ciples is attributed to the unscientific basis of the bour-
geoisie capitalist culture. Foreign graduates of the Soviet
Frunze Military Academy and the Voroshilov General Staff
Academy indicate there is a general disdain and even arro-
gance toward the "old, outmoded" Western approach to mili-
tary strategy and tactics. 19
These laws are of two types, (1) general laws, which
apply to basic strategy and doctrine and (2) laws of armed
conflict, which are more specific in scope. The general laws
of war quoted below are found in Marxism- Leninism on War and
the Army and Principles of Operational Art both part of the
Soviet "Officers Library" military studies series. Five of
the more important of these general laws are listed hier-
archly as follows:
1. The Course and Outcome of Wars are Dependent on
Their~Political Aims
This is directly related to the previous discussion
of the different types of wars, e.g. , imperialist, just or
unjust. The outcome of an imperialist war always favors the
anti-imperialist though this in itself does not ensure
victory. Thus communists inherently carry an advantage in
war. The other part of this law points to the intensity of
the conflict, for wars of only marginal impact on a coun-
try' s interests are likely to be less violent than either
civil wars or wars between opposing social systems. For
example, if United States survival had been the issue in




As presented by Afghan Army officer defectors to the
"Soviet Operations Research" class at the Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, Ca. , August 1985.
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2. The Course and Outcome of War are Dependent on the
Economic Potential of the Warring Sides
Consistent with emphasizing the economic basis of
historical development, Soviet theoreticians also assert
that the outcome of a war is heavily dependent on the
production capabilities, industrial base, and overall
economic wealth of a country relative to its enemy. The
tremendous industrial capacity of the United States was
unquestionably a major factor in the Allied defeat of Axis
powers in World War II. This economic potential is
reflected both in the quantity and quality of weapons
produced, the reserves of material and food supplies, and
the ability to gear up and replace war losses.
This latter area is probably less important in the
nuclear age as the surprise and scale of conflict will make
this a "come as you are" war. The ability of modern rocket
weapons to strike deep into the enemy's rear areas, i.e. his
industrial base, further heightens the importance of
reserves and stockpiles in today's warfare. This may
account for the reported huge stockpiles of food and ware-
housed tanks and other war materials in the Soviet Union. It
may also explain the propaganda efforts exhorting the Soviet
population to "catch up and overtake" Western and especially
U. S. industrial production. Economic power can yield to the
Soviets both significant propaganda benefits and the poten-
tial for political and military hegemony.
3. The Course and Outcome of War are Dependent on the
Scientific Potential of tHe Warring Sides
This law gives weight to the potential for develop-
ment of revolutionary new weapons such as occurred with
nuclear devices. The Soviets are mindful of the immense
strategic nuclear dominance enjoyed by the United States
from 1945 to the late 1960s. The strength of a nation'
s
scientific research and development base can prevent techno-
logical surprise and more importantly strive to achieve it.
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Modern technology is currently the driving force behind
advances in military computer applications, micro-electronic
circuitry, and directed-energy weapons among others. If for
example, the Soviets were to first deploy an operational
anti-ballistic missile directed-energy weapon, the impact on
U. S. strategic weapons, and by implication deterrence, would
be significant. The importance given this law accounts for
the strenuous Soviet efforts to acquire Western technology
(technology transfer) and also Soviet efforts to control or
halt certain U. S. exploratory research, e. g. , the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI). The emphasis given to this law of
war and corresponding Soviet direction of resources is
certain to increase as we move further into the era of
science and technology.
4. The Course and Outcome of War are Dependent upon the
Correlation of Moral-Political ana Psychological
Capabilities
This can simply be termed the national will to
prevail in war. It is an amalgam of the political aim of a
war, the will for national survival, and old-fashioned
patriotism. In a methodical campaign that would shock many
sensitive Western "peace movement" members, the Soviets have
systematically indoctrinated and prepared their population
for nuclear war:
The moral-political preparation of the people for war is
accomplished under direction of the Communist Party .
. . The political-moral preparation of the Soviet people
for war consists mainly in educating them in the spirit
of Soviet patriotism. love of country and the Communist
Party, and teaching them to be ready to suffer any hard-
ships of war for the purpose of achieving victory.
[Ref. 21: p. 329]
This preparation runs the gamut from the near incessant
deification and glorification of the Soviet sacrifices of
World War II to officially sanctioned "hate America"
campaigns. The spectrum and intensity of this psychological
preparation is incomprehensible to Westerners but it is a
86
very real and documented fact of Soviet life. 20
World War II demonstrated the importance "the rear"
could bear on fighting on "the front". The Soviets
evidently feel "the rear" and both civilian and military
morale will be of equal or more importance in the thermonu-
clear age.
Conviction as to the justness of a war and recognition
of the necessity to sacrifice one s life for the good of
one's brothers raises the spirit of soldiers and forces
them to bear unprecedented hardships. [ Ref . 29: p. 93]
5. The Course and Outcome of War are Dependent upon the
Relationship of" the Military Force's- of the
Belligerent Sides
This law pertains to what in the U. S. would be
termed "combat readiness. " This is the first priority in
U. S. military strategy but only the fifth in the Soviet
hierarchy of war. The reason for this is not that the
Soviets attach any less importance to combat readiness, but
that they see war, especially a prolonged modern nuclear
conflict, as involving elements of much broader scope, i. e.
,
economic, scientific potential, stockpiles and reserves, and
national will. Certainly the experience of Vietnam as shown
that strength or combat potential of military .forces is of
little help if the political aims and national will are
questionable. All things being the same, however, military
strength can overcome an enemy and is important. This
combat potential covers the totality of readiness from size
of forces, mobility, and firepower, to reserve force and
mobilization capabilities.
The foregoing Soviet laws of war address not only
the importance of military strength to warfighting but the
criticality of economic, political, and social factors in
20 For more on the Soviet psychological and social
profile see Margaret Mead. Soviet Attitudes Toward
Authority
. Greenwood Press, 1951.
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achieving victory. The hierarchical listing of these
factors would indicate that military strength alone is not
decisive in war. Wartime does not begin with the opening
cannon shot, but with years of preparing and building the
economic, scientific, and social infrastructures.
D. THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT
A subset of the objective laws of war are the laws of
armed conflict: 21
The laws of armed conflict are the deep internal, essen-
tial, necessary, stable, repetitious ties and relation-
ships among phenomena of military operations or their
attributes which are manifested on battlefields in the
course of armed conflict itself. [ Ref . 29: p. 56]
These laws apply strictly to military actions at the theater
level and below and are based on the study and analysis of
past military campaigns. Unlike their Western counterparts,
the Soviets support sizeable ongoing statistical analyses of
historical military campaigns seeking to establish common
themes or actions that led to either victory or defeat.
These principles provide guidelines and norms for future
military action and are probably tested extensively in
Soviet wargames and exercises prior to incorporation into
operational warplans. From these studies the following
partial list of guiding principles has emerged:
1. The Law of Dependence of Methods of Armed Combat on
the Means of its Waging
This law says that the type of weapons employed in a
conflict can be decisive. The side that employs rifles will
probably win out over those using bows and arrows. The same
21 The following laws of armed combat' were extracted
from Harriet F. and William F. Scott, The Armed Forces of
the USSR, and I. Savkin. The Basic Principles~o~f Operational
Art , (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 197T) trans. U. S. Air Force, U. S.
Government Press, 1971.
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holds true for nuclear versus conventional weapons. The
importance of logistics and training in support of armed
combat is a corollary to this law.
2. The Law of Cooperation of Troops According to Place ,
Time , and~Goal
This is largely the combined arms issue of coordi-
nating air, artillery, and troop attack for maximum effec-
tiveness. This also has application in the modern age of
coordinated cruise and ballistic missile attack where each
side seeks to saturate and overwhelm an enemy's defenses.
3. The law of Dependence of Combat Action on Conformity
of the CHaracter of Control to
"
the Arms and Means of
Armed Combat
This pertains to the commander's ability to
correctly appraise the combat situation and issue directives
that will correctly control its desired outcome. This in
essence is a problem of command and control.
4. The Law of Dependence of Victory in Armed Combat on
Concentrating Basic Forces in the Decisive Direction
This is the age old problem of concentrating maximum
forces on the decisive point of the battlefield at the crit-
ical time.
The aggregate of these "laws of armed conflict" is
the overall ' "combat might" of a force. The force that enjoys
the best weapons, logistics, plan, and commanders will
likely prevail in combat. Though most Western commanders
would no doubt agree with the validity of these findings, it
is unlikely that many have undertaken the extensive histor-
ical and analytical studies required in Soviet military
academies.
The Soviets put great emphasis on understanding
these combat norms and principles. The intent is to exercise
and provide commanders with guidelines that will prove
useful in the unregulated chaos of war. Rather than being
passive or merely reactive to the chance events of war, the
Soviets seek to tilt these probabilities in their favor:
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A considerable degree of regulation of the process of
armed conflict may be achieved only by those commanders
who possess the moral-psychological qualities, a deep
knowledge of the laws of warfare and armed conflict, an
ability to carry out in practice the principles of mili-
tary art based on the concrete situation, and a capa-
bility to foresee a majority of chance phenomena and
influence them in a timely and intelligent manner.
[Ref. 29: p. 60]
Though Marxism-Leninism may of itself be suspect as
a legitimate science, it has spawned an extensive and
creative scientific study of warfare that leads many Soviet
senior officers to believe that they enjoy a sizeable advan-
tage over their Western enemy.
E. SUMMARY
The Soviets are quite dedicated to annihilating their
international class enemies. A fatalistic, deterministic
view of the world social order gives primacy to the "inevit-
ability" of conflict, including war. This in turn has given
rise to a society that is increasingly militaristic in
orientation. The Soviet Union operationalizes this polit-
ical viewpoint in a military doctrine which mobilizes and
directs national resources toward long established political
goals. Far from disavowing nuclear weapons or war, the
Soviets have incorporated the military advantages and
changes they bring into their military doctrine and science.
They do this while simultaneously advocating Western dives-
titure of these "immoral" weapons.
The ideological requirement for "scientific substantia-
tion" has promoted the development and growth of an entire
science of military thought in the Soviet Union. Unlike many
Western countries, the Soviet Union holds both military
science and its scientists ( e. g. , military officers) in high
esteem for they may be the agents affecting social "devel-
opment" in the world. The "objective laws" discovered in
military science give a "high context" portrayal of future
military conflict. Indeed, many of its tenets (demoralizing
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the Western "rear") may already be in operation. A nation's
national security infrastructure (the "rear") is as impor-




The American people have only themselves to blame because
they lack the stamina to stay the course against the
Russians who are 'Sparta to our Athens . "
Henry Kissinger, 28 November 1970
as quoted by Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.
in On Watch-A Memoir, N. Y. Times
Book Co. , 1977
A. OVERVIEW
Soviet concepts of war have developed out of the Russian
political culture. This culture is deeply based in Russian
history and modern Marxist-Leninist ideology. Russian
history has been dominated by the issue of survival in a
hostile and unforgiving world. Survival in this environment
has made the Russian rely heavily on his immediate circle of
friends--his mir--for support and sustenance. Even then
trust has been a precious commodity to be rationed very
carefully, for weakness and vulnerability has meant near
certain death. Concerned with such mundane issues as food
and protection from human and natural adversity, Russian
society has accepted harsh and often despotic rule as neces-
sary to achieve the cohesiveness and unity required to meet
the threats to survival. A ruling elite has risen that
reflects the same "fortress mentality" and secrecy of the
mir. This has resulted in Russian isolation from significant
political and philosophical revolutions, notably the
Reformation and Renaissance, which greatly affected and
liberalized Western political culture.
The impact of the Byzantine church was equally signifi-
cant in isolating Russia and accelerating the drive toward
absolutism. The Russian Orthodox Church' s claim as the true
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seat of Christianity and the new "Third Rome" gave rise to a
xenophobism that both rejected foreign influences and gave
rise to increased Soviet power. Deriving power and legiti-
macy directly from God, the Tsars saw themselves in a
fatherly messianic role with the Russian state and people as
their property and children. The population became passive
and apolitical as guidance and authority was always given
from above. The Tsar and his supporting bureaucracy sought
to eliminate any competing and potential moderating sources
of power. The result was a firmly entrenched' Moscow elite
that sought to protect its position through a very conserva-
tive and autocratic style of government.
History has taught the Russians that outsiders and
foreigners are not to be trusted. The long history of inva-
sion and war has shown that peace is obtainable only through
strong armies and expanded frontiers--to the point that
pre-emptive attack or armed intervention in a bordering
state is justified if they present a threat. Control or
domination of bordering countries has thus long been central
to Russian ideas of security. War has also broken the
"myth" of Western humanitarianism and liberalism. The barba-
rianism and ruthlessness of Hitler's armies were seen as
confirmation of the cruelty and devastation to be expected
from the West. This message is still communicated today
through the ongoing propaganda campaigns surrounding World
War II.
The Russian legacy thus teaches that the West has little
to offer and that peace is best achieved on one's own terms.
Concepts of compromise are alien to a culture that has
traditionally seen itself as the citadel of Truth and center
of the civilized world. A strong "patrimonial" elite has
seen its role as preserving its own position of power while
directing a politically lethargic population.
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This political legacy continues under Marxist-Leninist
rule. The 1917 October revolution while ending Tsarist rule,
preserved and even heightened Russian xenophobic and messi-
anic tendencies. It did this through the philosophy of
Marxism-Leninism which rejected the capitalistic and accom-
panying liberal-democratic movements dominating most of
Europe. A philosophic body of thought was established that
cast itself as arbiter of truth and the spearhead of human
progress. This philosophy became the first theory of man to
explain everything from biology to politics. The world
became predictable if man could only decipher the scientific
laws or keys to its operation.
The new Bolshevik ruling elite adopted these viewpoints
while systematically eliminating any counterrevolutionary
liberal-democratic Russian tendencies and proponents.
Through the purification ritual of the purges the Soviet
Communist Party became as monolithic and orthodox as its
religious Russian Orthodox predecessor.
The success of the October 1917 Revolution taught the
Bolsheviks the virtues of being bold and seizing power when
the situation presented itself. The Russian Civil War
(1918-1920) and internal Party struggles have also proven
the utility of an "end justifies the means" moral code where
any action is acceptable if it promotes the power and
elitest position of the Party. Threats to the Party
(including populations) can legally be liquidated under this
mindset. Violence is therefore not necessarily bad as it can
create the opportunity for revolution and change.
This new communist ethic rejects Western concepts of
"fair play" and compromise. Responding to the messianic call
for world revolution, Marxist-Leninists can justify a wide
range of actions if advancement down the historical path
toward communism is furthered. This manifests itself in an
expedient attitude toward Western held values such as peace
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and sanctity of life. These values are only superficial and
tied to the current social class in power. Because a social
class becomes obsolete and expendable as history progresses
so are its current beliefs and values seen as only transi-
tory.
The Marxist-Leninist state ideology also serves as the
modi operandi for political action and relations with other
nations. These nations are either with the revolution or
against it. Those countries that follow the CPSU's leader-
ship down the path of communism can expect peace. Those
countries that seek to thwart historical progress or under-
mine revolution risk eternal conflict, domestically and
externally, until they are toppled. War is always a manifes-
tation of class conflicts that are irreconcilable. It is a
"sacred duty" of the CPSU and other socialist powers to
support oppressed peoples in their class struggles. As
conflict in the world is unavoidable, the CPSU must prepare
for any eventuality, including nuclear war. Nuclear war
though revolutionary to methods of warfare has not changed
the nature of warfare which is politics. Wars which promote
CPSU progressive policies are just wars, those which do not
are unjust and immoral.
Both Tsarist and modern Soviet society are "high
context" societies in that they rely heavily on implicit
"hidden meanings" and programming in societal communica-
tions. To understand all of what is said in Marxist-Leninist
Russia means to be conversant in Russian history, culture,
language and ideology. Words that appear innocuous to the
outsider are ripe with meaning to the native Soviet.
Codewords such as just war, imperialist war, aggression, and
defense evoke a series of qualifications and connotations
understandable only by an individual raised and "programmed"
for years in the Soviet culture. This facet of Soviet
culture can present intelligence analysis problems for the
West.
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This high context view of the world carries into the
Soviet view of war. War between competing social systems
involves more than conflict on the military-political level.
Efforts to weaken and undermine the enemy social order must
involve attacks on the entirety of his political, economic,
scientific, and moral-psychological capabilities. These
efforts to weaken the enemy are initiated prior to military
attack. Efforts must likewise be taken to strengthen Soviet
potentials in these areas. The importance of moral-
psychological resilence was demonstrated during World War
II. Modern nuclear "come as you are" warfare makes this and
the other objective laws of war even more important today.
When coalition war does come or as the Soviets say "When
war is forced upon us," there can be no measure of compro-
mise or substitute for total victory. Victory will not occur
with the final battlefield defeat of the enemy but with the
liquidation of the last class enemy:
the Soviet language of war does not begin where the
American does, with a breach of legality, or end where
it does with a military defeat. It begins with the
exacerbation of class warfare (which emerges often as
the warfare of political parties) and ends with nothing
less than the transformation of society. The last Soviet
battle does not take place when the missiles have ceased
to fly, but when the revolutionary executions against
the wall have stopped. [ Ref . 31: p. 31]
B. IMPACT OF SOVIET ASSYMETRIES
The West, and the American public in particular, appear
ignorant of the nature of the Soviet threat. They know that
somehow Russia is the enemy, but they are oblivious to the
cultural and ideological assymetries that make for this
situation. They are certainly unaware that conflict prepar-
atory to war may already be taking place on the economic,
scientific, and psychological-moral levels. This is undoubt-
edly the Soviet view.
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My purpose in this thesis has been to provide a sampling
of Soviet viewpoints, especially on war, that demonstrate
the great assymetries that exist between the U. S. and the
Soviet Union. I have shown that to the Soviets the "cold
war" is a natural outgrowth of the current world socio-
political confrontation between capitalist and socialist
systems. To the Soviets the "Cold War" existed long before
the post-World War II tensions of Berlin and Korea. Soviet
preparation for the annihilation of its international class
enemies began soon after the Soviets consolidated their
power in 1922. With the exception of World War II, a contin-
uous state of political, economic, and ideological war has
existed since that time. The massive heavy industrialization
undertaken by Stalin was probably as much an attempt to
prepare for the inevitable class showdown as anything else.
The formulation and ideological requirement to adhere to the
"objective laws" of warfare also explains the Soviet's
current reluctance to engage in extensive consumer oriented
production at the expense of the armaments industry. From
the Soviet standpoint, consumer goods and a higher standard
of living are secondary to establishing overwhelming mili-
tary and economic power and the psychological-political
advantages this brings. The Soviets have opted for the
"guns" side of the "guns and butter" decision as they are
locked in a final battle with capitalism.
What is also readily apparent is that the Soviet laws of
war reflect the same broad and encompassing view of social
conflict as that espoused by Karl Marx. If conflict occurs
across the entirety of the social, economic, and political
specrums then one should prepare accordingly in each of
these areas. This is exactly what the Soviets have done.
They have established a high context view of war that occurs
at all levels while the U. S. and the West continue to view
war as strictly a military-political struggle. From the
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Soviet perspective, they have adopted a systems approach to
warfare involving systematic efforts to disrupt Western
political processes, destabilize the international economy,
and acquire or retard Western scientific gains. The use of
armed force is as a last recourse when the enemy has been so
weakened that victory is assured.
I have also shown that the Russian political legacy of
xenophobism and self-righteousness makes the likelihood of
Soviet fidelity to international peace organizations such as
the United Nations questionable at best. The Soviets will
not acknowledge that a compromise or middle ground exists,
they will always seek to steer negotiations and organiza-
tions they can influence toward Marxist-Leninist "objective
reality", i.e., Soviet interpretations of events. In this
regard, Soviet use of arms negotiations and "peace offen-
sives" fit in well with the antithesis of the "law of rela-
tionship of moral-political and psychological forces". If
good morale and correct psychological attitude can win a
war, cannot the reverse help defeat an enemy? Many commen-
tators have long suspected the Soviet's penchant for raising
expectations for peace, then threatening war, followed by
accusatory characterizations of Western motives, are all
designed to disrupt and demoralize the Western body pon-
tic's will to resist. Current European trends toward
neutrality, pacifism, and a "better Red than dead" mentality
may be the results of a deliberate Soviet strategy based on
this law of war. If Soviet objectives of European domina-
tion can be achieved without resort to war, this is much
preferable to risking thermonuclear destruction of the
Soviet homeland.
Military power does not necessarily have to be used. It
is not "use it or lose it" prospect. The Soviets see mili-
tary power as "money in the bank" that can be used to pres-
sure and direct an opponent toward a desired goal. Military
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force is thus only one tool in the Soviet strategic toolbag
and its use will not be in response to some emotional provo-
cation but as the result of a carefully deliberated polit-
ical decision. The Soviets would much rather peacefully
occupy Europe than have to fight for it. As Raymond Garthoff
has observed:
War is not the goal of Soviet (political) strategy; the
Soviets prefer to gain their objectives by peaceful
means--by forcing appeasement on the enemy. This consid-
eration holds a significant place in Soviet strategy,
which judges the long term trends and ' possibilities in
determining what risks are worth taking in the short
run. [Ref. 32: p. 11]
This latter point holds some seeds of hope, by virtue
that the Soviets are unlikely to react emotionally to events
or provocations. Instead they are more likely to carefully
assess the gains to be made from a given situation against
any probable losses and act accordingly. This appeared to be
their decisionmaking methodology during the Cuban missile
crisis. Indeed, one Soviet fear of the West, and of the U. S.
in particular, surrounds our unpredictable and often
emotional response to crisis (see Khrushchev Remembers )
.
Always seeking a "scientific" analysis of the "correlation
of forces," the Soviets will probably be very cautious in
the use of military force.
C. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
The West is faced with an enemy few understand. In this
author's experience this is reflected in the tendency of
American military officers to mirror image American concepts
of war onto their Soviet counterparts. This is an ill-
advised and dangerous practice that will continue as long as
there exists a lack of knowledge on the Soviets. All too
often military officers receive advanced (primarily tech-
nical) education without understanding the military-
strategic basis for its undertaking. This ignorance can lead
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to miscalculation and surprise—and with these errors the
danger of catastrophic war.
For American policymakers and military officers it is
especially important to appreciate the Soviet view of war.
What is required is a continuum of officer education on the
nature of the Soviet enemy--his philosophy, his methods, and
his art of war. While this education does occur for those
few senior officers assigned to war colleges, it is impera-
tive that this exposure begin much earlier— at the officer
entry level— and continue throughout his career. This
education should begin with a one quarter or semester length
course at the military academies, ROTC, OCS, etc. This
initial exposure could be followed up through Department of
Defense sponsorship of a monthly periodical on the subject.
This would further stimulate academic interest and study of
the Soviet view of war. Similar to how the military's drug
education and prevention efforts have spilled over into the
civilian world, these DOD sponsored efforts could cause an
upsurge in public awareness and education on the Soviet
Union. An educated public would be more aware and responsive
to U. S. measures to deal with the Soviet threat.
Another effort in this direction would be the establish-
ment of postgraduate level study in military science. These
courses would educate military officers in the nature of
modern warfare, strategy, and tactics. This would give
impetus to the creation of a cadre of military PhD officers
fully versed in formulating and implementing U. S. military
strategy. These officers could form the nucleus of the JCS
Staff Corps bantered about in Congress. A model for this
program of study exists in the Soviet Voroshilov General
Staff Academy. Here military officers pursue advanced mili-
tary science degrees and find subsequent utilization in the
Soviet General Staff or in Soviet "think tanks" that deal
with the "enemy", e.g. , the Institute of the U.S.A. and
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Canada. The U. S. needs to get serious in this regard and
develop more strategists conversant in Soviet and U. S.
doctrine and strategy.
Study and mastery of the Russian language should also be
encouraged by DOD so that our officers are conversant and
can read original Russian texts. This would assist in
alleviating the problems inherent in loose or "watered down"
translations, and hidden contextual meanings and "code-
words". The recent DOD recommendation for proficiency pay
for foreign language mastery is a step in the right
direction.
D. SUMMARY
The Soviets view the world from a perspective remarkably
alien to that of the West. It is important that these
differences be understood by the Western body politic in
general, but certainly by those policymakers and military
officers charged with its defense. Analysis of Soviet
political and military intentions must be made keeping these
assymetries in mind,. otherwise we risk defeat in achieving
U. S. objectives--be it at the negotiating table or on the
battlefield. Counter-strategies and counter-tactics can be
developed only if we know what we are countering. The
implications are equally ominous on the more specific mili-
tary systems level. Here the attractiveness of Soviet pre-
emption ("frustrating" the "imperialist's" attack) is an
area that deserves immediate attention in the design of
surviveable U. S. Command and Control. Again, these and other
military design issues are best understood if the nature of
the Soviet threat is fully understood. This thesis has been
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